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I. Introduction1 
The Great Recession has had widespread implications for the financial well-being of 
millions of Americans.  With the collapse of the housing market beginning in 2007, many have 
found themselves unemployed or underemployed, all while locked into home mortgages that 
they can no longer afford.  Dreams of retirement, along with hard-saved nest eggs, have 
evaporated for many, especially after the collapse of the stock market.   
Along with these stories of personal hardship, many states have experienced historic 
reductions in tax revenues during the Great Recession.  While it appears that state revenues are 
now stable, they are still well below the heights prior to the 2008 fiscal year and few experts 
project a quick rebound (NCSL, 2011).  The loss in tax revenue was backfilled to some extent by 
an influx of federal funds through the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, but 
now those funds are drying up amid concerns of the federal budget deficit.  As state legislatures 
and governors begin considering spending plans for the upcoming fiscal year, they are faced with 
some very difficult budget choices.   
Among the many tough choices states must make is how to address funding shortfalls in 
public employee pension systems.  In public sector employment, pensions have long been a key 
component of the compensation system and an integral way to attract and retain talent in public 
service positions.  The pension is considered a form of deferred compensation, which means that 
workers receive a salary lower than the going rate for their education, skills and job requirements 
in exchange for an enhanced retirement package (Bender & Heywood, 2010).  State employees 
incur an opportunity cost by taking a lower-salaried state job over a private sector job.  While the 
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salaries of state jobs have traditionally been lower, benefit packages have tended to compensate 
for the difference.   
There is growing concern and controversy surrounding the unfunded liabilities for state 
employee pensions and other retiree benefits.  The precipitous drop in the stock market hugely 
impacted the solvency of many funds.  Reports of “Trillion Dollar Gaps” (PEW, 2009) in the 
states’ pension plans certainly cause alarm for any budget planner.  Unfortunately, when it comes 
to retirement benefits financing, legislators face an uphill battle.  Projections and evaluations of 
solutions are hampered by a confluence of factors including the continuing retirement of the 
Baby Boom Generation, gutted stock market values and other investment losses, the present 
fiscal instability of states and lagging income tax revenues, and the years of underfunding of 
pension trust funds.  Constitutional limitations on policy alternatives further constrain the options 
presented to lawmakers.  Also, by making the state government job’s benefit package less 
attractive, legislators could be causing an inadvertent brain drain from the state government 
sector, losing their most competitive and valuable prospective employees (Caron & Osborne, 
2010).   
As many state legislatures across the country face difficult decisions regarding policies 
and action plans to address these unfunded liabilities, it is vital that decision makers understand 
how pension systems work and how action plans could impact states’ ability to fulfill 
commitments.  Understanding public pension systems is hampered by a voluminous and 
technical vocabulary.  This report provides an overview of pension financing concepts and 
terminology, explains major concepts, and presents comparative financing data.  As well as 
serving a draft for a freestanding primer, this report has been prepared as background for the 
pension section of a new edition of Josephine LaPlante’s 1993 monograph Dollars and Sense: 
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Maine State Budgeting at a Crossroads.  We hope that that information provided will help arm 
Maine legislators with the knowledge necessary to make informed decisions on behalf of the 
citizens.  
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II. TYPES OF PUBLIC PENSION PLANS2 
 Two broad types of retirement funding approaches are used in the public and private 
sectors: defined benefit and defined contribution plans.  Under a defined benefit plan, 
governmental jurisdictions promise a specified level of retirement benefits, for example, one-half 
of the average earnings during the last three years of employment.  The employing jurisdiction 
must determine how much money needs to be invested now for funding to be adequate to support 
promised future income at the time the employee retirees.  Some states, local governments, and 
governmental entities like state universities and authorities offer employees a defined 
contribution plan.  Under a defined contribution plan, the governmental jurisdiction contributes 
an agreed upon percentage of salary but makes no promises about the sufficiency of funding for 
retirement income.   
Data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics indicates that in 2008, 84 percent of employees 
of state and local governments had access to a defined benefit (DB) plan and 30 percent could 
access a defined contribution (DC) plan (terms defined below).  However, only 22 percent of 
those working in the private sector could access a DB plan and only 62 percent had a DC plan 
available to them (Wiatrowski, 2009).  Let us consider these funding approaches more closely. 
2.1  Defined Benefit Plans 
Under a defined benefit plan, retirees are guaranteed an annual income for life.  The 
income level is based upon salary level in the last several years of employment and may be 
adjusted for longevity.  For instance, in the state of Maine and employee is eligible after 5 years 
for a pension that is equal to 2 percent of their average high 3 years of compensation multiplied 
by their years of service.  Most plans also allow for a cost of living adjustment (COLA) to 
                                                 
2  This section was researched and written by Morgan Beschle & Tim Feeley. 
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Table 1. Characteristics of Defined Benefit and Defined Contribution Plans 
 
 Defined Benefit (DB) Plan Defined Contribution (DC) Plan 
Employer 
Contributions 
Federal rules set contribution 
requirements and administer penalties 
if requirements are not met. Employer 
contribution is based on a percentage 
of payroll to cover the actuarially 
determined annual required 
contribution.   
No requirement that the employer 
contribute, except in certain types of 
401(k) plans.  Employer may choose 
to match a portion of the employee’s 
contributions or to contribute without 
employee contributions.   
Employee 
Contributions 
Generally, employees contribute to 
these plans based on a percentage of 
their payroll. 
Many plans require the employee to 
contribute in order for an account to be 
established. 
Managing the 
Investment 
Employer is responsible for ensuring 
that contributions plus investment 
earnings will be enough to pay the 
promised benefit. 
Employee often is responsible for 
managing the investment of his/her 
account, choosing from investment 
options offered by the plan.  
Amount of 
Benefits Paid 
upon the 
Retiree 
Benefit is based on a formula in the 
plan, often using a combination of the 
employee’s age, years of employment 
with the employer and/or salary. 
Benefit depends on contributions 
made by the employee and/or the 
employer and investment earnings.  
Benefits will depend on market value 
at the market at the time of payout. 
 
Type of 
Retirement 
Benefit 
Payments 
Traditionally, these plans pay the 
retiree monthly annuity payments that 
continue for life.   
Retiree may transfer the account 
balance into an individual retirement 
account (IRA) from which the retiree 
withdraws money, or may receive it as 
a lump sum payment. Some plans also 
offer monthly payments through an 
annuity. 
Guarantee of 
Benefits 
The Federal government, 
through the Pension Benefit 
Guaranty Corporation, guarantees 
some amount of benefits. 
No Federal guarantee of benefits. 
Leaving 
Before 
Retirement 
Age 
If an employee leaves after 
vesting in a benefit but before 
the plan’s retirement age, the benefit 
generally stays with the plan until the 
employee files a claim for it at 
retirement. Some defined benefit plans 
offer early retirement options. 
Employee may transfer the account 
balance to an individual retirement 
account (IRA) or, in some cases, 
another employer plan, where it can 
continue to grow based on investment 
earnings.  The employee also may take 
the balance out of the plan, but will 
owe taxes and possibly penalties, thus 
reducing retirement income.  
 
Sources:  What You Should Know About Your Retirement Plan.  U.S. Department of Labor, Employees Benefits 
Security Administration.  www.dol.gov/ebsa.     
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compensate for inflationary erosion of purchasing power.  Most public DB plans have a vesting 
period, which means the employee must work for a specified number of years before he or she 
becomes eligible for any retirement benefit.  If the employee chooses to retire before the 
designated retirement age, the employee may only be allowed to remove their portion of the 
contribution, which leaves the employer contribution remaining in the pension fund.  When 
available, participation in the DB plans is compulsory for most public employees. 
A defined benefit (DB) plan is funded through three sources: employee contributions, 
investment earnings and employer contributions.  The DB plan puts the risk on the employer 
(taxpayer), who must ensure that the combination of annual contributions and return on 
accumulated system assets generate adequate holdings to pay out benefits at the promised level 
and throughout the lifetime of the retiree.  Therefore, investment options and decisions are up to 
the employer to determine.  In a DB pension system, the system can manage the risk of longevity 
by planning to make pension payments for the average number of years each employee who 
becomes vested and reaches retirement will collect.  Some covered will leave employment prior 
to vesting, which means his or her contributed funds must be returned but the government’s 
contributions will remain in the system to subsidize the government’s required future 
contributions.  Some retirees will collect retirement income for many years, while others will 
collect for fewer years.  An individual saving for his or her own retirement runs the risk of living 
longer than their finances – or saving for many years and dying before they use their retirement 
funds. 
DB plans offer the advantage of having their investments professionally managed while 
maintaining a low overhead.  The participants in DB plans do not have to try and research 
investment options, or assume the risk of making one poor investment choice that will eat away 
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their principle.  Public pension systems also offer low overhead in terms of this service, as little 
as 0.1 percent of assets held for systems with more than 10,000 employees (Hustead, 2009).  
2.2  Defined Benefit Plans 
In contrast to defined benefit plans, defined contribution plans make no particular 
promises about the adequacy of retirement income.  Rather, the employer commits to 
contributing a specified amount or percentage of salary on behalf of the employee. The employee 
often matches the employer’s contribution by contributing a share of salary.  Although 
employers may or may not manage the defined contribution plan, a key feature of this retirement 
funding approach is that once money is contributed to an employee’s retirement account, the 
employee owns the asset.  Should the employee leave the jurisdiction of employment, assets are 
“portable,” which means they may be taken to the next job location or paid out to the employee.  
Although portability is a significant strength of this retirement funding approach, its benefits may 
be offset by the necessity of the employee assuming all risks.  Governments participating in 
defined contribution plans have no financial responsibility to employees once the required 
contribution has been made.  Investment losses are borne by the employee and may jeopardize 
retirement security.  As a consequence, employers often place restrictions on investment options 
and withdrawals.  In addition, defined contribution plans typically serve as supplements to social 
security, not replacements. 
Although DC plans have proliferated as the dominant retirement plan offered by private 
sector employers, some retirement experts are concerned that they offer too little security to 
retirees, possibly requiring twice the contributions that most retirees currently make due to 
unknown life expectancy issues (Waring, 2009).  Employees take the burden of ensuring that 
their investments grow and produce enough to support them and their families during retirement.  
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Although control over their own funds sounds empowering, employees do not always have the 
expertise or resources to maximize their investment returns.  This makes for an uneven playing 
field among public employees.  In addition, the freedom to withdraw funds from the account 
early without penalty is also a burden, because some employees may take money out too early, 
therefore not having enough to endure their retirement financially.  
Defined contribution (DC) plans (referred to as a 401k plan in the private sector) are 
financed through contributions from employee, investment earnings, and in some cases, 
contributions from the employer.  Typically, employees have input as to how much and in what 
manner to invest their own funds.  The “defined contribution” piece refers to the number of 
dollars that the state commits to investing into the employee’s account; normally, employers 
match the employees’ investments up to a certain percentage of their salary.  For example, the 
employer may agree to match all employee investments at 50 percent, up to 6 percent of his/her 
salary.  If an employee contributes 4 percent of his/her salary, the employer will match 2 percent, 
for a total contribution equivalent to 6 percent of his/her salary.  At an employee contribution 
rate of 6 percent, the employer would match the contribution with 3 percent; however, since the 
employer maxes the match at 50 percent of 6 percent, the employer contribution will not increase 
above 3 percent, even if the employee chooses to contribute 8 or 10 percent of his/her salary.   
Typically, the plan is administered by a third party financial management entity, and 
employees have full access to choose how their funds are invested, within the boundaries of 
funds offered for investment at that firm.  At any given time, the DC account will reflect its 
current market value, based on what has been invested to date.  In other words, at any given time 
the account will reflect the value that the funds would sell for today.  Employees may be able to 
borrow from the invested funds before retirement age, but will only have access to the funds for 
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which they are vested; vesting occurs after the employee has been a part of the organization for a 
certain length of time and is at the discretion of the State.  For example, an employee may be 
fully vested after five years of employment, but could become 20 percent vested for each year of 
employment leading up to the final fifth year.  In this example, an employee leaving after two 
years would be able to take all the funds that resulted on account of his/her contributions, but 
only 40 percent of the worth that resulted from the State’s contribution, whereas an employee 
leaving after five years would own the entire fund. 
2.3  Changing Between Plan Types 
Some states are considering changing from defined benefit to defined contribution plans.  
The Research Director of the National Association of State Retirement Administrators suggests 
that “it would be wiser for states to ask employees to contribute more toward underfunded plans 
than to switch to 401(k)-type plans” (Greenhouse, 2011).  “Employee contributions along with 
investment returns make up the majority of public pension fund revenues” and therefore should 
be carefully considered before being removed to save government dollars (NCSL, 2011).  In 
addition to keeping state employment an attractive option for citizens, there are other reasons 
that DB plan pensions may be in the best interest of the State.  The National Conference for State 
Legislatures (NCSL) released a fact sheet on state and local pensions, which included the 
argument that “pension dollars help the economy in every jurisdiction,” further explaining the 
point that reducing these benefits could have the unintended consequence of actually hurting the 
economy across states (NCSL, 2011).  In other words, pensions are distributed to people 
throughout the State, providing income and fueling the economy across urban and rural 
boundaries.  Although switching plans may gain the State liquid funds in the near-term, the long-
term impact may mean needed investment in the failing economy further down the road. 
10 
 
As state employers have begun to make the shift towards DC plans—setup much like 
401k systems in the private sector—public employees have not taken the change lightly.  Most 
recently, governors in Ohio and Wisconsin have been “engaged in bitter showdowns with public-
employee unions over wages, pensions and collective bargaining rights” (Greenhouse, 2011).  
Despite the battles, several states have made at least a partial change-over to a DC model, 
including Alaska, Colorado, Georgia, Michigan, Ohio and Utah.  Usually, an employee is 
covered by social security and then the employee makes contributions to a segregated retirement 
fund and many employers will match the contribution up to a certain percentage.  Many states 
offer an optional DC plan known as a 457(b) plan that allows employees to make unmatched, but 
pretax, payroll deductions.  Employees covered by a DB plan may elect to supplement their DB 
pension with a 457(b) plan.  
While moving to a DC plan may solve future funding issues, the switch-over will still not 
address current unfunded liabilities.  “As contributions move to individual investment accounts, 
less money goes into the traditional plan to help finance pensions promised to other workers,” 
which puts states in a catch twenty-two: caught between the promise of a better long-term plan 
and the more immediate needs of those already committed to the old system (Greenhouse, 2011).  
Another way to look at this issue is that instead of everyone paying into the same pot that then is 
used to dole out the retirement benefits for the elder generation, DC plans setup pots for 
individual employees.  By shifting the system so that the newer workers each setup their own 
fund, how will states now foot the bill for the near-term payout obligations for the elder 
generation in the old system?  Again, a shift towards the option that may put cash in the hands of 
the government in the short-term, may also be the very option that hurts Maine’s financial 
system in the long-term.   
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In addition to the argument that reduced benefits could create an unintended brain drain 
from government jobs, Teresa Ghilarducci, the Chair of Economic Policy Analysis at the New 
School for Social Research, argues that 401k-like systems attract “risk seekers and high turnover 
workers” and, because they mirror the market, provide the wrong incentives for spending during 
economic booms, and conversely saving during downturns (Ghilarducci, 2011).   Obviously, 
there are similar arguments that could be made in the opposite direction as to what type of 
workers want control over their own retirement investments etc., but this is just an example of 
the type of change in workers that a switch in benefits programming could bring.   
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III.  A CLOSER LOOK AT DEFINED CONTRIBUTION PLANS 3 
Public employees are accustomed to traditional defined benefit (DB) plans, which 
comprise the majority of state pension plans.  In 2010, all but five states offered DB pension 
plans to state employees (Snell, 2010).   
3.1 Annual Required Contribution  
Each year, an annual contribution is determined that is sufficient to cover the retirement 
benefits promised to current workers.  This currently accruing amount is referred to as the 
“normal cost” of the system.  Accounting standards requiring disclosure of any unfunded 
liabilities for pensions have pushed state and local governments to pre-fund retirement benefits, 
rather than pay for the benefits as retirees become eligible for them (a common practice through 
the early 1980s.)  If states have not made adequate contributions in the past, or if assets do not 
appreciate at the expected rate of return, then the state is liable for making up the difference and 
eliminating the unfunded actuarial liability (UAL).  When a plan is not fully funded, an 
additional employer contribution is required to reduce the amount of the “unfunded liability.”   
 The total annual amount that must be contributed, which is called the Annual 
Required Contribution (ARC), is the sum of current or “normal” costs plus 
catch up on any unfunded liability. 
3.2 Employee and Employer Contributions 
Each employee’s annual contribution to a defined benefit pension system is set at a 
percentage of their salary.  In contrast, the employer’s annual contribution is the amount needed 
to cover the normal cost of promised benefits less the employees’ contributions.  The portion of 
the annual contribution necessary to support the benefit level promised to retirees—the normal 
                                                 
3  This section was researched and written by Morgan Beschle & Tim Feeley. 
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cost— is determined through actuarial methods.  Factors that determine a government’s 
contribution level include the expected rate of investment return, salary increases (inflation and 
merit), the projected impact of inflation on cost of living increases for retirees, ages of plan 
participants, the number of employees who will become vested, the number of years vested 
employees will work (and earn benefits), the numbers of years during which plan participants 
will receive retirement income, age at retirement and rate of disability for members.  The number 
of assumptions required may make controversial the contribution amount determined necessary.  
As assumptions change, the accruing liability may increase or decrease. 
An earnings forecast is used to estimate how much the average investment will earn in 
the future marketplace.  Investment returns are known as the discount rate because they 
essentially offset the amount that the employer and/or employee must contribute to cover the 
remainder of the ARC.  Most public pension systems assume an annual rate of return of 8 
percent (Alicia H. Munnell, 2010).  This has been seen as actuarially sound practice, as it reflects 
the risk assumed in the investment portfolio.  However, as LaPlante and Honadle (2011) point 
out, many practices viewed as sound prior to the Great Recession have been shown to be have 
exacerbated fiscal problems associated with the economic downturn.  The expected return on 
investment has come under scrutiny; some economists suggest that the rate selected be more 
conservative to compensate for the impact on investments of economic upswings and downfalls.  
Stateline published an article about pension fund losses and gains:  “A California-based 
investment advisor, reports a 13.09 percent median return among public plans with more than $1 
billion in assets for fiscal 2010, compared to an 18.76 percent loss in fiscal 2009” (Fehr, 2010, p. 
1).  The article notes that although the downturn caused some under-funding of pension plans, 
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the problem of underfunding occurred before the downturn and is compounded as the Baby 
Boomers begin to retire.   
At a given point in time, the accumulated holdings of a pension system have a value.  The 
value fluctuates daily as market forces influence the value of investments.  The difference 
between the value of system assets and benefits due to prior and current employees accrued to 
date is called the Unfunded Actuarial Liability (UAL).  The “funding ratio” of a pension 
system is arrived at by dividing the value of its assets by the value of its obligations.  If a state 
has assets of $15 million, for example, but has actuarial liabilities of $20 million, they have a 
funding ratio of 0.75 or 75%.  In contrast, if a state has assets equal to actuarially determined 
liabilities, the funding ratio is 100% of what is known as “fully funded.” 
Unfunded liabilities have become a hot issue as a consequence of recession-induced 
sharp decreases in funding ratios.  Although pension liabilities have always been considered in 
bond ratings, recent news reports stating that Moody’s Investor Services will “begin” to consider 
funding status in credit ratings has escalated anxiety.  A recent article: “Moody’s Begins 
Treating Pension Liabilities like Bond Debt” outlines California’s decision to add pensions to 
bond debt, due to “weaker than expected investment results” (Mendel, 2011, p. 1).   
As stated, the funding ratio of a pension system is simply a matter of calculating the 
amount of assets in the pension trust fund and the expected growth of the investments and the 
amount of the obligations that are expected to be placed on it.  However, many factors go into 
the calculation of liabilities (see discussion of actuarial methods for determining annual 
contribution requirements.)  Employee contributions, employer contributions, and most 
importantly, investment earnings affect the UAL (From MePERS, Costs Report, Feb 2011).   
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3.3. Unfunded Liabilities: A Closer Look at Origins and Issues 
Much of the sudden attention on unfunded liabilities has been driven by the major losses 
in investment earnings over the course of the recent Great Recession.  Depending on how the 
benefit plan is setup, states take the contribution dollars of their employees and invest them into 
the stock market.  Of course, depending on how the stock market is performing at any given 
time, the earnings on these investments may rise or fall.  Still, LaPlante and Honadle conjecture 
that despite these losses, the pattern of investment over the last few decades has been impressive, 
in terms of how much was invested and the rate of return.  It could be argued that the unfunded 
liabilities are not driven simply by the acute loss of investment earnings in the late “eighties,” but 
are, instead, a consequence of other confluent factors including a growing retiree population, 
shrinking workforce, increasing life expectancy and irresponsible return projections.   
For many years public pensions were funded on a pay-as-you-go basis, but as the public 
workforce expanded in the post World War Two era, retirement systems designed to manage 
funds and invest assets began to grow.  By pre-funding retirees’ pensions, governments were 
better able to afford benefit levels by allowing them to be paid for by investments overtime.   
In 1994 the Governmental Accounting Standards Board (GASB) issued new standards for 
accounting for DB pension plans.  The new framework for standards, first issued in papers 
numbered 25 and 27, determined that state and local governments should disclose the value of 
the assets set aside for pension benefits and the obligations that have been actuarially determined 
to be placed upon them (Government Actuarial Standards Board, 1994).  While GASB has no 
legal authority or way to compel compliance, they are the recognized body that establishes 
common standards and some states do have statutes that require compliance with GASB 
standards (GAO, 2008). 
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The recent yawning gap of public retirement systems away from 100 percent funding has 
led many commentators to suggest that governments should follow the private sector in ending 
or reducing access to DB plans as well.  There are, however, very large differences between a 
private sector businesses and the public sector (GASB, 2006).  The private sector operates by 
selling a good or service and delivering a profit to equity holders, while government provides 
services to enhance the well-being of its citizens.  A private business depends on revenue 
through the voluntary purchase of its good or service, while the public sector is financed through 
involuntary collection of taxes and fees.  If demand for a good or service evaporates, the business 
could quickly disappear, while the disappearance of state government is unlikely despite its 
shortcomings.  This is a simple but hugely important factor when considering how much weight 
to place on fully funding a pension system.  Recently, the Governmental Accounting Standards 
Board proposed a revision to the way pension liabilities are calculated, which would increase the 
required annual contribution of state governments, in an effort to better align states with the U.S. 
Government Accountability Office’s (GAO) recommendation that public pensions are funded by 
at least 80 percent (Kim & Kerrigan, 2010).   
Private sector accounting standards have demanded that pension systems be fully funded 
because businesses can go bankrupt or cease operations.  The long-term nature of both a pension 
system UAL and the longevity of public entities permit and even demand different standards 
than used in the private sector.  While current market conditions have eroded the investment 
gains for pension systems considerably, many still have the assets available to continue making 
payments for years to come.  Even with no new contributions, it is estimated that state pension 
plans could pay out benefits for decades before going insolvent.  The General Accounting Office 
has considered public pension funds that are at least 80 percent funded to be adequately funded 
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(GAO, 2008).  The central question about funding ratios is whether or not the UAL is being 
retired in a way that is actuarially sound and does not cause the plan sponsor undue fiscal stress.   
The Impact of Trends on System Sufficiency 
In the introduction to a recent journal symposium entitled: “Beyond the Storm: 
Surmounting Challenges of the New Public Finance,” Josephine LaPlante and Beth Honadle 
address the under-funding of retirement benefits, citing not only pensions but also other benefits, 
such as health insurance, that are at risk (LaPlante & Honadle, 2011).  State liabilities include 
financial commitments made to state employees; these commitments are comprised of retirement 
benefits that eventually become the lifeblood of retired state workers.  State employees consider 
their retirement benefits as part of their lifelong financial plans.  On the surface, it may seem like 
a simple task for states to estimate the amount of liabilities and save enough to reach the mark; 
however, this estimation process hinges on a giant game of probability, including steps such as 
predicting when each employee will retire, how much he/she will make by the time he/she retires 
and how much the invested funds will grow between now and the payout date, among others.  
The woes of states’ unfunded liabilities do not end at retirement pensions, though, because in 
addition to pension liabilities, there is a larger issue of unfunded health insurance payments 
looming, one that is even more difficult to project due to the uncertainty around health care costs 
in the coming decades.     
The retirement of the baby boomer generation and increasing longevity are causing 
increases in the levels and durations of pension and health insurance payouts, which will place 
unprecedented and in some cases unanticipated pressure on already-stressed systems.  
Projections carried over from the 1980s will therefore need to be reassessed based on the 
additional years that the average retiree will need to be supported.  Baby Boomers retiring with 
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higher salaries will require higher payouts, while what were robust employee contributions will 
be replaced with lower payments, due to incoming employees with lower salaries.  Take, for 
example, when an employee contributing 10 percent of a $65,000 salary ($6,500 per year) is 
replaced by a worker contributing 5 percent of a $35,000 salary ($1,750 per year).  The pension 
fund will take a hit of $4,750 per year, not to mention the additional pressure put on the system 
by the now-retired worker collecting a hearty pension from the system.  With lower contributions 
into the fund, it could become more difficult for the State to support the retired population with 
monthly payouts.  In addition, LaPlante and Honadle point out that the same trends apply to the 
Federal government, which may impact the Federal government’s ability to aid the states during 
these difficult times (LaPlante & Honadle, 2011).  A decrease in employee contributions 
combined with a reduction in federal aid could produce a far more difficult financial situation. 
3.4  Social Security Coverage and Required Contributions to Defined Benefit Plans 
Public sector plans may be exempt from Social Security if they are deemed to meet 
certain criteria (IRS, 1991).  So-called “safe harbor” plans must meet certain minimum 
requirements for how salaries are defined, how benefit accrual percentages are set and how 
benefits are accrued.  The benefits must be in the form of a lifetime annuity.  Any changes to a 
system that may erode benefits must be approved by the Internal Revenue Service.  If the state is 
denied “safe harbor” status is required to participate in the Social Security System (MePERS, 
2011).  Participants in the Maine Teachers and State Employees Retirement System are not 
covered by Social Security.   
When public sector workers who are covered by a public DB pension do not participate 
in the Social Security system, the public sector defined benefit plan serves as a substitute for 
social security retirement income security rather than as a supplement, the norm in most states 
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and local governments.  Public employees who receive retirement income from an approved 
pension plan currently face a reduction in the amount of social security benefits they otherwise 
would receive due to earnings from employment in covered positions.   
When a state or local government does not participate in social security, public 
employees do not earn credits toward social security eligibility for time worked.  When a state 
contemplates replacing a defined benefit pension plan to social security, whether an employee 
may collect social security at retirement and how much they will collect is constrained by the 
lack of participation credits earned toward social security.  Hence, this is no easy change.   
When a state has an approved substitute retirement income program, neither the public 
employees nor the employing state or local jurisdiction contribute towards social security, 
although they do contribute toward Medicare coverage.  The amounts that would need to be 
contributed to social security and Medicare rates are shown in Table 2. 
 
Table 2:  Social Security and Medicare Tax Rates, 2010 and 2011 
Employment Tax Type 2010 2011 
Social Security 
Employee 6.2% on <= $106,800 4.2% on earnings <=$106,800 
Employer 6.2% on <= $106,800 4.2% on earnings <=$106,800 
MEDICARE  
Employee 1.45% on All Earnings 1.45% on All Earnings 
Employer 1.45% on All Earnings 1.45% on All Earnings 
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In states that use their retirement system as a substitute for social security, the percentage 
of payroll contributed by the employer annually to cover promised benefits accruing to current 
employees tends to exceed the employer share of social security.  In addition, the contribution 
rate also tends to be higher than what is seen in states where the defined benefit plan is intended 
to serve as a supplement only to social security retirement income.  In Maine, the actuarially 
determined normal cost of the pension system requires a contribution equal to 13.15 percent of 
payroll.  Currently, the employee pays 7.65 percent of salary, which is above the 6.2% 
previously required for social security and approaching twice the new, lower contribution of 
4.2%.  In contrast, the State of Maine contributes only 5.5% of salary of current state workers 
and teachers.  Retirement system records show a higher rate of contribution by the State, but this 
amount reflects the normal cost contribution plus additional funding to reduce the large unfunded 
liability.   
Abandoning the Maine state retirement system altogether and using social security in its 
place would have the following effects: 
(1)  Employee contribution rates would decline from 7.65% to 4.2%. 
(2) State contributions for current state workers and teachers would decline from 5.5% to 
4.2%. (There would have been an increase to 6.2% prior to 2011.) 
(3) The State would remain fully responsible for paying down the unfunded liability of 
the retirement system, which currently costs substantially more than the annual 
contribution made on behalf of current employees. 
(4) State workers and teachers nearing retiring age would not be able to accrue adequate 
“credits” (years of contributions to social security) to gain eligibility; if eligibility was 
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gained, the amount of social security would be reduced by the smaller lifetime 
amount paid into the system.  
3.5 Employee Benefit Protections 
Benefits accrued in a DB plan have been found in most states to be protected by the state 
constitution or by the body of contract and property rights law.  It has been found in many cases 
that if a state promises a certain benefit, it cannot diminish that benefit for current vested workers 
or current retirees.  This is important to consider when looking at altering benefits in order to 
change the cost structure in states.  The constraints of this reality mean that many reform efforts 
may only apply to prospective employees and those not currently vested (Monahan, 2010).  
Therefore efforts to cut current costs are also limited in effect. 
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IV.  A Comparative Perspective on Features of Maine’s State Employees’  
and Teachers’ Retirement System4  
Although this issue applies to the country at large, it is important to understand Maine’s 
particular situation as an individual state.  A recent report entitled: “Reinventing Maine 
Government,” claims that the state of Maine currently owes “$4.4 billion for unpaid obligations 
for public employee pension and health care plans” (Caron & Osborne, 2010, p. 26).  The state 
pension plans are unique in that they are guaranteed regardless of the investment success or 
economic state; this type of plan is often referred to as a DB plan.  In other words, 100 percent of 
the investment risk is put on the State, instead of sharing that burden with the employee.  In 
addition, Maine “pays 100 percent of its retirees’ health insurance and 45 percent of retired 
teachers’ health insurance” (Caron & Osborne, 2010, p. 27).  It is important to consider Maine’s 
unique liabilities when determining action plans, as guaranteed benefits in both pension output 
and health benefits put more pressure on the system to produce.  The report suggests some major 
changes, including automatically enrolling all employees in a DC plan that puts the risk on the 
employee and reduces benefits for early-retirees (Caron & Osborne, 2010).  However, as the 
discussion in the previous section underscored, there are pros and cons to each type of retirement 
plan. 
The State of Maine differs from many states facing UALs.  The State of Maine has a 
1997constitutional amendment mandating that the UAL in the pension system be retired by 2028 
(31 years from the ratification of the constitutional amendment) and that any new costs be paid 
for immediately.  If the costs are due to “experience loss”, or losses on investments from market 
changes, the state has to retire those losses in 10 years (Constitution of Maine, pp. Article IX, 
                                                 
4  This section was researched and written by Morgan Beschle.  Morgan Beschle compiled the comparative system 
data and characteristics and analyzed similarities and differences from Maine.  Tim Feeley assisted by providing 
information on the unfunded liability and Constitutional provisions. 
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Section 18-A).  The State of Maine, therefore, has a slightly different calculation in determining 
the amortization schedule of the UAL from other states. 
Retiring the UAL has garnered added attention in the current budget debate because of 
the market losses from the Great Recession and the constitutional provision to make up for those 
market losses in ten years, whereas most states may amortize the market losses over a longer 
period.  For Maine, these costs are increasing in the FY2012-13 state budget biennium to $916M 
($448M for FY 2012 and $468M for FY 2013). This compares to total biennial costs for FY 
2010‐2011 of $629M. 
4.1  Structural Features  
The structural issues in Maine’s state retirement system are outlined in Table 3.  Most 
state systems cover state employees and teachers, but systems may be separate or combined.  
Although most state employees receive social security benefits in addition to their pension plan, 
there are several states in which public employees do not receive social security coverage, 
depending on the fund: Alaska, California, Connecticut, Illinois, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, 
Massachusetts, Missouri, Nevada, Ohio and Texas.  There are some serious implications of 
employees not receiving social security benefits, as the entire burden of retirement benefits is 
now on the state governments to deliver.   
As shown in Table 3, states in which employees do not receive social security benefits 
generally have higher contribution rates to make up for the increased pressure on the pension 
fund to supply 100 percent of employees’ retirement benefits.  The median employee 
contribution rates amongst states in which employees receive social security benefits is around 5 
percent, while states in which employees do not receive social security benefits is around 8 
percent.  Among states in which employees do not receive social security benefits, Nevada 
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requires the highest employee contribution rate of 11.25 percent, whereas Maine is below the 
median at 7.65 percent.  Being a state with employees that do not receive social security, there is 
more pressure on Maine’s government to provide retirement benefits; it could be argued that a 
lower employee contribution rate is contributing to the struggle to close the gap of unfunded 
liabilities.  At one time, states’ participation in the Social Security program was elective, but 
more recently it has become required (Schmidt, 2010). 
                                                 
5 S = State, L = Local, T = Teachers 
6 Alaska PERS and TRS converted to a defined contribution plan on July 1, 2006 
7 Alaska PERS and TRS converted to a defined contribution plan on July 1, 2006 
Table 3: Comparison of State-Local Retirement Systems' Employee and Employer Contribution 
Requirements by Type and Funded Status, 2008 
 
State Fund Name 
Employee 
Coverage5 
Social Security 
Coverage? 
Employee 
Contribution 
Employer Normal Cost Plus 
Contribution Toward 
Unfunded Liability (if 
relevant) 
Funded Ratio 
2008 
Alabama ERS S, L Yes 5.00 percent 4.90 percent 75.9 percent 
Alabama TRS T Yes 5.00 percent 6.39 percent 77.6 percent 
Alaska PERS S, L No 8.00 percent 5.00 percent6 N.D. 
Alaska TRS T No 8.00 percent 7.00 percent7 N.D. 
Arizona SRS S, L, T Yes 9.00 percent 6.45 percent 82.2 percent 
Arkansas PERS S, L Yes 5.00 percent 12.54 percent 90.0 percent 
Arkansas TRS T Yes 6.00 percent 12.87 percent 84.9 percent 
California PERS S, L Yes 
5.00 percent or 
6.00 percent 10.55 percent 87.2 percent 
California TRS T No 8.00 percent 8.25 percent 89.0 percent 
Colorado PERA S, L, T No 8.00 percent 10.15 percent 67.9 percent 
Connecticut SERS S Yes 2.00 percent 4.70 percent 51.9 percent 
Connecticut TRS T No 6.00 percent 4.40 percent 70.0 percent 
Delaware SEPP S, T Yes 
3.00 percent above 
$6,000 6.85 percent 103.1 percent 
Florida FRS S, L, T Yes Non-contributory 8.69 percent 105.4 percent 
Georgia ERS S Yes 1.25 percent 6.80 percent 89.4 percent 
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Georgia TRS T Yes 5.00 percent 7.96 percent 94.7 percent 
Hawaii ERS S, L, T Yes 6.00 percent 5.85 percent 67.5 percent 
Idaho PERS S, L, T Yes 6.23 percent 10.39 percent 93.3 percent 
Illinois SERS S Yes 4.00 percent 16.56 percent 46.1 percent 
Illinois TRS T No 9.40 percent 9.15 percent 56.0 percent 
Illinois MRF L Yes 4.50 percent 7.58 percent 84.3 percent 
Indiana PERF S, L Yes 3.00 percent 6.26 percent 98.2 percent 
Indiana TRF T Yes 3.00 percent 4.97 percent 48.2 percent 
Iowa PERS S, L, T Yes 3.90 percent 6.05 percent 89.1 percent 
Kansas PERS S, L, T Yes 4.00 percent 7.39 percent 70.8 percent 
Kentucky ERS S Yes 5.00 percent 3.55 percent 54.2 percent 
Kentucky CERS L Yes 5.00 percent 3.85 percent 77.1 percent 
Kentucky TRS T No 9.86 percent 9.86 percent 68.2 percent 
Louisiana SERS S No 7.80 percent 7.31 percent 67.0 percent 
Louisiana TRSL T No 8.00 percent 15.5 percent min 70.2 percent 
Maine PERS S, L, T No 7.65 percent 17.01 percent 79.7 percent 
Maryland SRPS S, L, T Yes 2.00 percent 8.86 percent 78.6 percent 
Massachusetts SERS S No 9.00 percent 3.80 percent 71.6 percent 
Massachusetts TRS T No 11.00 percent 1.96 percent 73.9 percent 
Michigan SERS S Yes Non-contributory 8.30 percent 71.1 percent 
Michigan MERS L Yes Varies by plan Varies by plan 77.7 percent 
Michigan PSERS T Yes 
3.00 percent to 
4.30 percent 5.60 percent 71.5 percent 
Minnesota MSRS S Yes 4.50 percent 4.50 percent 90.2 percent 
Minnesota PERA L Yes 6.00 percent 6.50 percent 73.6 percent 
Minnesota TRA T Yes 5.50 percent 5.50 percent 82.0 percent 
Mississippi PERS S, L, T Yes 7.25 percent 11.85 percent 72.9 percent 
Missouri SERS S Yes Non-contributory 12.75 percent 85.9 percent 
Missouri LAGERS L Yes 
0 percent-4.00 
percent Varies by plan 97.5 percent 
Missouri PSRS T No 10.86 percent 10.86 percent 83.4 percent 
Montana PERS S, L Yes 6.90 percent 6.94 percent 90.0 percent 
Montana TRS T Yes 7.15 percent 7.47 percent 79.9 percent 
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8 Converted to individual cash balance plans from defined contribution plans 
9 Converted to individual cash balance plans from defined contribution plan 
10 Average rate for 2008 
Nebraska SEPP8 S Yes 4.80 percent 
156 percent of member 
contribution 103.4 percent 
Nebraska CEPP9 L Yes 4.50 percent 
150 percent of member 
contribution 108.1 percent 
Nebraska SPP T Yes 7.28 percent 
101 percent of member 
contribution 90.6 percent 
Nevada PERS S, L, T No 11.25 percent 11.25 percent 76.2 percent 
New Hampshire NHRS S, L, T Yes 5.00 percent 4.67 percent 67.8 percent 
New Jersey PERS S, L Yes 5.50 percent 
4.80 percent state; 3.44 percent 
local 77.4 percent 
New Jersey TPAF T Yes 5.50 percent 1.8 billion (total varies) 72.1 percent 
New Mexico PERA S, L Yes 7.42 percent 16.59 percent 92.0 percent 
New Mexico ERA T Yes 7.90 percent 5.66 percent 71.5 percent 
New York ERS S, L Yes 3.00 percent 9.60 percent10 105.8 percent 
New York TRS T Yes 3.00 percent 7.63 percent 104.2 percent 
North Carolina TSERS S, T Yes 6.00 percent 3.36 percent 104.7 percent 
North Carolina LGERS L Yes 6.00 percent 4.80 percent 99.5 percent 
North Dakota PERS S, L Yes 4.00 percent 4.12 percent 92.6 percent 
North Dakota TRF T Yes 7.75 percent 8.25 percent 81.9 percent 
Ohio PERS S, L No 10.00 percent 14.00 percent 96.3 percent 
Ohio STRS T No 10.00 percent 14.00 percent 79.1 percent 
Oklahoma PERS S, L Yes 
3.00 percent to 
3.50 percent 12.46 percent 73.0 percent 
Oklahoma TRS T Yes 7.00 percent 9.00 percent 50.5 percent 
Oregon PERS S, L, T Yes 6.00 percent 7.50 percent 112.2 percent 
Pennsylvania SERS S Yes 6.25 percent 9.51 percent 89.0 percent 
Pennsylvania PSERS T Yes 
7.32 percent 
(average) 4.00 percent 91.2 percent 
Rhode Island ERS S, T Yes 
8.75 percent (9.50 
percent teachers) 
1.64 percent (2.33 percent 
teachers) 57.5 percent 
South Carolina SCRS S, L, T Yes 6.50 percent 3.51 percent 69.7 percent 
South Dakota SRS S, L, T Yes 6.00 percent 6.00 percent 97.2 percent 
Tennessee CRS S, L, T Yes Non-contributory 13.58 percent 96.2 percent 
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The employer contribution rates for retirement systems shown on Table 3 include 
contributions toward the unfunded liability in addition to the normal cost. The aggregation of 
these two types of contributions make comparisons difficult.  In addition, in some states the 
contribution percentage is applicable only up to a certain specified earning level.  Using this 
comparative data to benchmark a state’s potential contribution requires more detail than 
provided.   
Also, it is important to keep in mind that Maine is one of only a small number of states 
that use their retirement systems to replace rather than supplement social security. State 
Texas ERS S Yes 6.00 percent 6.45 percent 92.6 percent 
Texas TRS T No 6.40 percent 6.58 percent 86.2 percent 
Texas MRS L Yes 
5.00 percent, 6.00 
percent, or 7.00 
percent 5.00 percent to 14.00 percent 74.4 percent 
Utah SRS S, L, T Yes Non-contributory 11.62 percent to 14.22 percent 84.2 percent 
Vermont SRS S Yes 5.10 percent 5.93 percent 94.1 percent 
Vermont TRS T Yes 3.40 percent 3.54 percent 80.9 percent 
Virginia SRS S, L, T Yes 5.00 percent 6.15 percent 82.3 percent 
Washington PERS S, L Yes 
4.61 percent; non-
contributory 4.72 percent 119.9 percent 
Washington TRS T Yes 
4.93 percent; non-
contributory 5.70 percent 130.4 percent 
West Virginia PERS S, L Yes 4.50 percent 10.50 percent 84.2 percent 
West Virginia TRS T Yes 6.00 percent 7.50 percent 50.0 percent 
Wyoming WRS S, L, T Yes 5.57 percent 5.68 percent 78.6 percent 
Milwaukee City L Yes 5.50 percent 11.22 percent (due in 2010) 99.1 percent 
Milwaukee County L Yes Non-contributory $34,981,095 95.7 percent 
Wisconsin WRS S, L, T Yes 5.00 percent 4.80 percent 99.7 percent 
Sources:  2008 Comparative Study of Major Public Employee Retirement Systems prepared by Daniel Schmidt, Wisconsin 
Legislative Council in December 2009 (Revised in May 2010).   
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Table 4: Comparison of Pension Plan Features, State-Local Retirement Systems 2008 
State Fund Name Employee Coverage11 
Social Security 
Coverage? 
Normal Retirement (Employee 
Age/Years Employment) 
Early Retirement 
(Age/Years) 
Reduction for Early 
Retirement  Vesting Period 
Alabama  ERS  S, L  Yes  60/10; any/25  None    10 years  
Alabama  TRS  T  Yes  60/10; any/25  None    10 years  
Alaska  PERS  S, L  No  59-1/212 None    5 years  
Alaska  TRS  T  No  59-1/213 None    5 years  
Arizona  SRS  S, L, T  Yes  65; 62/10; R80  50/5  Table  Immediate  
Arkansas  PERS  S, L  Yes  65/5; any/28  55/5; any/25  6 percent per yr  5 years  
Arkansas  TRS  T  Yes  60/5; any/28  Any/25  
Lesser of 5 percent for 
each yr less than 28 
yrs of service or 5 
percent for each yr 
prior to age 60  5 years  
California  PERS  S, L  Yes  55/5  50/5  Multiplier varies  5 years  
California  TRS  T  No  60/5  55/5; 50/30  
3 percent to 6 percent 
a yr  5 years  
Colorado  PERA  S, L, T  No  65/5; 50/30; 55/R85; any/35  50/25; 55/20; 60/5  Table  5 years  
Connecticut  SERS  S  Yes  62/10; 60/25  55/10  3 percent per yr  5 years  
Connecticut  TRS  T  No  60/20; any/35  Any/25; 55/20; 60/10  3 percent per yr  10 years  
                                                 
11 S = State, L = Local, T = Teachers 
12 Defined contribution plan:  taxes and penalties may apply if contributions are withdrawn prior to age 59-1/2 
13 Defined contribution plan:  taxes and penalties may apply if contributions are withdrawn prior to age 59-1/2 
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Delaware  SEPP  S, T  Yes  62/5; 60/15; any/30  55/15; any/25  2.4 percent per yr  5 years  
Florida  FRS  S, L, T  Yes  62/6; any/30  Any/6  5 percent per yr  6 years  
Georgia  ERS  S  Yes  65/10; any/30  60/10; any/25  
7 percent per yr; max 
35 percent  10 years  
Georgia  TRS  T  Yes  60/10; any/30  Any/25  7 percent per yr  10 years  
Hawaii  ERS  S, L, T  Yes  62/5; 55/30  55/20  5 percent per yr  5 years  
Idaho  PERS  S, L, T  Yes  65/5; R90  55/5  
3 percent per yr for 1st 
5 yrs; 5.75 percent per 
yr thereafter  5 years  
Illinois  SERS  S  Yes  60/8; R85  55/25  6 percent per yr  8 years  
Illinois  TRS  T  No  62/5; 60/10; 55/35  55/20  6 percent per yr  5 years  
Illinois  MRF  L  Yes  60/8; 55/35  55/8  3 percent per yr  8 years  
Indiana  PERF  S, L  Yes  65/10; 60/15; 55/R85  50/15  
Determined using 
"look up" table 10 years  
Indiana  TRF  T  Yes  65/10; 60/15; 55/R85  50/15  
5 percent per yr to 60; 
1.2 percent per yr age 
60 to 65  10 years  
Iowa  PERS  S, L, T  Yes  65; 62/20; R88  55/4  3 percent per yr  4 years  
Kansas  PERS  S, L, T  Yes  65/1; 62/10; R85  55/10  
2.4 percent/7.20 
percent per yr  10 years  
Kentucky  ERS  S  Yes  65/4; any/27  55/5; any/25  
5 percent/4 percent per 
yr  5 years  
Kentucky  CERS  L  Yes  65/4; any/27  55/5; any/25  
5 percent/4 percent per 
yr  5 years  
Kentucky  TRS  T  No  60/5; any/27  55/5  5 percent per yr  5 years  
Louisiana  SERS  S  No  60/10  Any/20  
Determined using 
10 years  
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"look up" table 
Louisiana  TRSL  T  No  60/5; 55/25; any/30  Any/20  Multiplier varies  5 years  
Maine  PERS  S, L, T  No  62/5  Any/25  6 percent a yr  5 years  
Maryland  SRPS  S, L, T  Yes  60/5; any/30  Any/25  
6 percent a yr; max 42 
percent  5 years  
Massachusetts  SERS  S  No  55/10; any/20  None    10 years  
Massachusetts  TRS  T  No  55/10; any/20  None    10 years  
Michigan  SERS  S  Yes  60/10; 55/30  55/15  6 percent a yr  10 years  
Michigan  MERS  L  Yes  Varies by plan  Varies by plan  Varies by plan  6, 8, or 10 yrs  
Michigan  PSERS  T  Yes  60/5; any/30  55/15  6 percent a yr  10 years  
Minnesota  MSRS  S  Yes  62; 60/6; any/30; R90  55/3  
Determined using 
"look up" table 3 years  
Minnesota  PERA  L  Yes  65/1; any/30; R90  55/3  
Determined using 
"look up" table 3 years  
Minnesota  TRA  T  Yes  65/1; 62/30; any/30; R90  55/3  
Determined using 
"look up" table 3 years  
Mississippi  PERS  S, L, T  Yes  60/8; any/25  None    8 years  
Missouri  SERS  S  Yes  
65/5; 65/4 active; 62/5; 60/15; 
48/R80  57/5; 55/10  6 percent a yr  5 years  
Missouri  LAGERS  L  Yes  60/5; R80 option  55/5  6 percent a yr  5 years  
Missouri  PSRS  T  No  60/5; R80; any/30  55/5; any/25  
Determined using 
"look up" table 5 years  
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Montana  PERS  S, L  Yes  65/any; 60/5; any/30  50/5; any/25  
Determined using 
"look up" table 5 years  
Montana  TRS  T  Yes  60/5; any/25  50/5  
6 percent; 3.6 percent 
a yr  5 years  
Nebraska  SEPP S  Yes  55   Money purchase  3 years  
Nebraska  CEPP L  Yes  55   Money purchase  3 years  
Nebraska  SPP  T  Yes  65; 55/R85  60/5; any/35  3 percent a yr  5 years  
Nevada  PERS  S, L, T  No  65/5; 60/10; any/30  Any/5  4 percent a yr  5 years  
New Hampshire  NHRS  S, L, T  Yes  60/any  50/10; R70/20  
1.5 percent; 3 percent; 
4 percent; 6.67 percent 
a yr  10 years  
New Jersey  PERS  S, L  Yes  62/any  Any/25  3 percent a yr  10 years  
New Jersey  TPAF  T  Yes  60/any  Any/25  3 percent a yr  10 years  
New Mexico  PERA  S, L  Yes  65/5 to 60/20; any/25  None    5 years  
New Mexico  ERA  T  Yes  65/5; any/25; 60/R75  R75  
Determined using 
"look up" table 5 years  
New York  ERS  S, L  Yes  62/5; 55/30  55/5  
6 percent/3 percent a 
yr  5 years  
New York  TRS  T  Yes  62/5; 55/30  55/5  
6 percent/3 percent a 
yr  5 years  
North Carolina  TSERS  S, T  Yes  65/5; 60/25; any/30  60/5; 50/20  3 percent a yr  5 years  
North Carolina  LGERS  L  Yes  65/5; 60/25; any/30  60/5; 50/20  3 percent a yr  5 years  
North Dakota  PERS  S, L  Yes  65/any; R85  55/3  6 percent a yr  3 years  
North Dakota  TRF  T  Yes  65/5; R90  55/5  6 percent a yr  5 years  
Ohio  PERS  S, L  No  60/5; any/30  55/25  3 percent a yr  5 years  
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Ohio  STRS  T  No  65; any/30  60/5; 55/25  3 percent a yr  5 years  
Oklahoma  PERS  S, L  Yes  62/6; R90  55/10  
Determined using 
"look up" table 8 years  
Oklahoma  TRS  T  Yes  62/5; R90  55/5; any 30  
Determined using 
"look up" table 5 years  
Oregon  PERS  S, L, T  Yes  65/any; 60/any; 58/30  55; any 30  Full actuarial reduction 5 years  
Pennsylvania  SERS  S  Yes  60/3; any/35  Any/5  
3 percent to 6 percent 
per yr average  5 years  
Pennsylvania  PSERS  T  Yes  62; 60/30; any/35  55/25  3 percent per yr  5 years  
Rhode Island  ERS  S, T  Yes  60/10; any/28  55/20  
Determined using 
"look up" table 10 years  
South Carolina  SCRS  S, L, T  Yes  65/any; any/28  60; 55/25  
5 percent a yr for each 
yr under age 65; 4 
percent a yr for each yr 
under age 28  5 years  
South Dakota  SRS  S, L, T  Yes  65/3; 55/R85  55/3  
Determined using 
"look up" table 3 years  
Tennessee  CRS  S, L, T  Yes  60/5; any/30  55/10; any/25  4.8 percent per yr  5 years  
Texas  ERS  S  Yes  60/5; R80  None      
Texas  TRS  T  No  65/5; 60/20; R80  55/5; any/30  
Determined using 
"look up" table 5 years  
Texas  MRS  L  Yes  60/5; 60/10; any/20 or 25 option  None    5 years  
Utah  SRS  S, L, T  Yes  65/4; any/30  Any/25; 60/20; 62/10  
3 percent a yr; full 
actuarial reduction for 
each yr before age 60  4 years  
Vermont  SRS  S  Yes  62/any; any/30  55/5  6 percent per yr  5 years  
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Vermont  TRS  T  Yes  62/any; any/30  55/5  6 percent per yr  5 years  
Virginia  SRS  S, L, T  Yes  65/5; 50/30  50/10; 55/5  
6 percent; 4.8 percent 
per yr 5 years  
Washington  PERS  S, L  Yes  65/5; 65/10  55/20; 55/10  3 percent a yr or table  5 yrs; 10 yrs  
Washington  TRS  T  Yes  65/5; 65/10  55/20; 55/10  
3 percent per yr or 
table  5 yrs; 10 yrs  
West Virginia  PERS  S, L  Yes  60/5; 55/R80  55/10  Full actuarial reduction 5 years  
West Virginia  TRS  T  Yes  60/5; 55/30; any/35  Any/30  Full actuarial reduction 5 years  
Wisconsin: 
Milwaukee  City  L  Yes  60/any; 55/30  55/15  
Determined using 
"look up" table 4 years  
Wisconsin: 
Milwaukee  County  L  Yes  60/any; R75  55/15  5 percent per yr  5 years  
Wisconsin  WRS  S, L, T  Yes  65/any; 57/30  55 
Varies by length of 
service  Immediate  
Wyoming  WRS  S, L, T  Yes  60/4; R85  50/4; any/25  5 percent per yr  4 years  
Sources:  2008 Comparative Study of Major Public Employee Retirement Systems prepared by Daniel Schmidt, Wisconsin Legislative Council in December 2009 (Revised in May 2010).   
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employees and teachers depend completely on state pensions and face offsets for spousal 
benefits.  In contrast, two private sector employees would face no penalties for both having 
401(k) plans and therefore would have more resources for potentially the same number of years 
of service and salary.   
As shown in Table 4, normal retirement age varies by state.  Normal retirement refers to 
the age at which an employee will be eligible for full retirement benefits (Schmidt, 2010, p.11).  
Some states require employees be a certain age and have served a certain number of years before 
being eligible for full retirement benefits.  In Maine, employees are eligible for full retirement 
benefits at age 62, as long as they have at least five years of service.  In addition, some plans 
offer early retirement, but with a penalty to the retirement benefit amount.  In Maine, employees 
can retire early at any age, as long as they have dedicated 25 or more years of service.  If 
employees retire early in Maine, their benefit is reduced by 6 percent per year (Schmidt, 2010).  
Although a 6 percent reduction is on the higher end when compared with other states, Maine 
offers such a young retirement age, that fewer employees should need to retire early and assume 
this reduction in benefits. 
 Social Security benefits also play a role in when an employee receives the full suite of 
retirement benefits.  The earliest age at which a person can receive Social Security retirement 
benefits is 62 years, at which point the benefits are reduced to take the longer payout period into 
account (Schmidt, 2010).  Employees that retire at age 65 are eligible for full Social Security 
benefits, although this age may increase over time with increasing longevity and health care 
advances.  It is important to note that Maine offers full retirement at a young age when compared 
to the federal Social Security program.  This feature places more pressure on the State of 
Maine’s system, due to the greater potential number of years of benefits payout.  Across the
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Table 5: Comparison of Actuarial Assumptions for State-Local Retirement Systems 2008 
State Fund Name 
Employee 
Coverage14 
Social Security 
Coverage? 
Normal Retirement 
(Age/Years) Vesting Period 
Actuarial 
Method 
Interest 
Assumption15 
Wage 
Inflation 
Economic 
Spread 
Alabama  ERS  S, L  Yes  60/10; any/25  10 years  Entry age  8.00 percent 4.50 percent 3.50 percent 
Alabama  TRS  T  Yes  60/10; any/25  10 years  Entry age  8.00 percent 4.50 percent 3.50 percent 
Alaska  PERS  S, L  No  59-1/216 5 years  Unit credit  N/A  N/A  N/A  
Alaska  TRS  T  No  59-1/217 5 years  Unit credit  N/A  N/A  N/A  
Arizona  SRS  S, L, T  Yes  65; 62/10; R80  Immediate  Unit credit  8.00 percent 4.25 percent 3.75 percent 
Arkansas  PERS  S, L  Yes  65/5; any/28  5 years  Entry age  8.00 percent 4.00 percent 4.00 percent 
Arkansas  TRS  T  Yes  60/5; any/28  5 years  Entry age  8.00 percent 4.00 percent 4.00 percent 
California  PERS  S, L  Yes  55/5  5 years  Entry age  7.75 percent 3.00 percent 4.75 percent 
California  TRS  T  No  60/5  5 years  Entry age  8.00 percent 3.25 percent 4.75 percent 
Colorado  PERA  S, L, T  No  
65/5; 50/30; 55/R85; 
any/35  5 years  Entry age  8.50 percent 3.75 percent 4.75 percent 
Connecticut  SERS  S  Yes  62/10; 60/25  5 years  Unit credit  8.25 percent 4.00 percent 4.25 percent 
Connecticut  TRS  T  No  60/20; any/35  10 years  Entry age  8.50 percent 4.00 percent 4.50 percent 
Delaware  SEPP  S, T  Yes  62/5; 60/15; any/30  5 years  Entry age  8.00 percent 3.75 percent 4.25 percent 
                                                 
14 S = State, L = Local, T = Teachers 
15 N.D. = Not Defined 
16 Defined contribution plan:  taxes and penalties may apply if contributions are withdrawn prior to age 59-1/2 
17 Defined contribution plan:  taxes and penalties may apply if contributions are withdrawn prior to age 59-1/2 
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Florida  FRS  S, L, T  Yes  62/6; any/30  6 years  Entry age  7.75 percent 3.00 percent 4.75 percent 
Georgia  ERS  S  Yes  65/10; any/30  10 years  Entry age  7.50 percent 3.75 percent 3.75 percent 
Georgia  TRS  T  Yes  60/10; any/30  10 years  Entry age  7.50 percent 3.75 percent 3.75 percent 
Hawaii  ERS  S, L, T  Yes  62/5; 55/30  5 years  Entry age  8.00 percent 4.00 percent 4.00 percent 
Idaho  PERS  S, L, T  Yes  65/5; R90  5 years  Entry age  7.25 percent 4.50 percent 3.25 percent 
Illinois  SERS  S  Yes  60/8; R85  8 years  Unit credit  8.50 percent 3.00 percent 5.50 percent 
Illinois  TRS  T  No  62/5; 60/10; 55/35  5 years  Unit credit  8.50 percent 3.50 percent 5.00 percent 
Illinois  MRF  L  Yes  60/8; 55/35  8 years  Entry age  7.50 percent 4.00 percent 3.50 percent 
Indiana  PERF  S, L  Yes  65/10; 60/15; 55/R85  10 years  Entry age  7.25 percent N.D.  N.D.  
Indiana  TRF  T  Yes  65/10; 60/15; 55/R85  10 years  Entry age  7.50 percent 3.25 percent 4.25 percent 
Iowa  PERS  S, L, T  Yes  65; 62/20; R88  4 years  Entry age  7.50 percent 4.00 percent 3.50 percent 
Kansas  PERS  S, L, T  Yes  65/1; 62/10; R85  10 years  Entry age  8.00 percent 4.00 percent 4.00 percent 
Kentucky  ERS  S  Yes  65/4; any/27  5 years  Entry age  7.75 percent 3.50 percent 4.25 percent 
Kentucky  CERS  L  Yes  65/4; any/27  5 years  Entry age  7.75 percent 3.50 percent 4.25 percent 
Kentucky  TRS  T  No  60/5; any/27  5 years  Unit credit  7.50 percent 4.00 percent 3.50 percent 
Louisiana  SERS  S  No  60/10  10 years  Unit credit  8.25 percent N.D.  N.D.  
Louisiana  TRSL  T  No  60/5; 55/25; any/30  5 years  Unit credit  8.25 percent 3.20 percent 5.25 percent 
Maine  PERS  S, L, T  No  62/5  5 years  Entry age  7.75 percent 4.50 percent 3.25 percent 
Maryland  SRPS  S, L, T  Yes  60/5; any/30  5 years  Entry age  7.75 percent 3.50 percent 4.25 percent 
Massachusetts  SERS  S  No  55/10; any/20  10 years  Entry age  8.25 percent N.D.  N.D.  
Massachusetts  TRS  T  No  55/10; any/20  10 years  Entry age  8.25 percent N.D.  N.D.  
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Michigan  SERS  S  Yes  60/10; 55/30  10 years  Entry age  8.00 percent 3.50 percent 4.50 percent 
Michigan  MERS  L  Yes  Varies by plan  6, 8, or 10 yrs  Entry age  8.00 percent 4.50 percent 3.50 percent 
Michigan  PSERS  T  Yes  60/5; any/30  10 years  Entry age  8.00 percent 3.50 percent 4.50 percent 
Minnesota  MSRS  S  Yes  62; 60/6; any/30; R90 3 years  Entry age  8.50 percent 4.50 percent 4.00 percent 
Minnesota  PERA  L  Yes  65/1; any/30; R90  3 years  Entry age  8.50 percent 4.50 percent 4.00 percent 
Minnesota  TRA  T  Yes  
65/1; 62/30; any/30; 
R90  3 years  Entry age  8.50 percent 4.50 percent 4.00 percent 
Mississippi  PERS  S, L, T  Yes  60/8; any/25  8 years  Entry age  8.00 percent 4.00 percent 4.00 percent 
Missouri  SERS  S  Yes  
65/5; 65/4 active; 
62/5; 60/15; 48/R80  5 years  Entry age  8.50 percent 4.00 percent 4.50 percent 
Missouri  LAGERS  L  Yes  60/5; R80 option  5 years  Entry age  7.50 percent 4.00 percent 3.50 percent 
Missouri  PSRS  T  No  60/5; R80; any/30  5 years  Entry age  8.00 percent 3.25 percent 4.75 percent 
Montana  PERS  S, L  Yes  65/any; 60/5; any/30  5 years  Entry age  8.00 percent 4.25 percent 3.75 percent 
Montana  TRS  T  Yes  60/5; any/25  5 years  Entry age  7.75 percent 4.50 percent 3.25 percent 
Nebraska  SEPP18 S  Yes  55 3 years  Entry age  7.75 percent 3.50 percent 4.10 percent 
Nebraska  CEPP19 L  Yes  55 3 years  Entry age  7.75 percent 3.50 percent 4.10 percent 
Nebraska  SPP  T  Yes  65; 55/R85  5 years  Entry age  8.00 percent 3.50 percent 4.50 percent 
Nevada  PERS  S, L, T  No  65/5; 60/10; any/30  5 years  Entry age  8.00 percent 3.50 percent 4.50 percent 
New Hampshire  NHRS  S, L, T  Yes  60/any  10 years  Entry age  8.50 percent 3.50 percent 5.00 percent 
New Jersey  PERS  S, L  Yes  62/any  10 years  Unit credit  8.25 percent 4.00 percent 4.25 percent 
New Jersey  TPAF  T  Yes  60/any  10 years  Unit credit  8.25 percent 4.00 percent 4.25 percent 
                                                 
18 Converted to individual cash balance plans from defined contribution plans 
19 Converted to individual cash balance plans from defined contribution plan 
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New Mexico  PERA  S, L  Yes  65/5 to 60/20; any/25  5 years  Entry age  8.00 percent 4.00 percent 4.00 percent 
New Mexico  ERA  T  Yes  65/5; any/25; 60/R75  5 years  Entry age  8.00 percent 3.00 percent 5.00 percent 
New York  ERS  S, L  Yes  62/5; 55/30  5 years  Aggregate  8.00 percent 3.00 percent 5.00 percent 
New York  TRS  T  Yes  62/5; 55/30  5 years  Aggregate  8.00 percent 3.00 percent 5.00 percent 
North Carolina  TSERS  S, T  Yes  65/5; 60/25; any/30  5 years  Entry age  7.25 percent N.D.  N.D.  
North Carolina  LGERS  L  Yes  65/5; 60/25; any/30  5 years  Entry age  7.25 percent N.D.  N.D.  
North Dakota  PERS  S, L  Yes  65/any; R85  3 years  Entry age  8.00 percent 4.50 percent 3.50 percent 
North Dakota  TRF  T  Yes  65/5; R90  5 years  Entry age  8.00 percent 3.00 percent 5.00 percent 
Ohio  PERS  S, L  No  60/5; any/30  5 years  Entry age  8.00 percent 4.00 percent 4.00 percent 
Ohio  STRS  T  No  65; any/30  5 years  Entry age  8.00 percent 3.00 percent 5.00 percent 
Oklahoma  PERS  S, L  Yes  62/6; R90  8 years  Entry age  7.50 percent 3.00 percent 4.50 percent 
Oklahoma  TRS  T  Yes  62/5; R90  5 years  Entry age  8.00 percent 3.00 percent 5.00 percent 
Oregon  PERS  S, L, T  Yes  
65/any; 60/any; 
58/30  5 years  Unit credit  8.00 percent 2.75 percent 5.25 percent 
Pennsylvania  SERS  S  Yes  60/3; any/35  5 years  Entry age  8.00 percent 3.30 percent 4.70 percent 
Pennsylvania  PSERS  T  Yes  62; 60/30; any/35  5 years  Entry age  8.25 percent 3.25 percent 5.00 percent 
Rhode Island  ERS  S, T  Yes  60/10; any/28  10 years  Entry age  8.25 percent 3.00 percent 5.25 percent 
South Carolina  SCRS  S, L, T  Yes  65/any; any/28  5 years  Entry age  7.25 percent 3.00 percent 4.25 percent 
South Dakota  SRS  S, L, T  Yes  65/3; 55/R85  3 years  Entry age  7.75 percent N.D.  N.D.  
Tennessee  CRS  S, L, T  Yes  60/5; any/30  5 years  Entry age-FIL20 7.50 percent 3.00 percent 4.50 percent 
Texas  ERS  S  Yes  60/5; R80    Entry age 8.00 percent 3.50 percent 4.50 percent 
                                                 
20 FIL = Frozen initial liability method 
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Texas  TRS  T  No  65/5; 60/20; R80  5 years  Entry age 8.00 percent 3.00 percent 5.00 percent 
Texas  MRS  L  Yes  
60/5; 60/10; any/20 
or 25 option  5 years  Unit credit  7.00 percent 3.00 percent 4.00 percent 
Utah  SRS  S, L, T  Yes  65/4; any/30  4 years  Entry age 7.75 percent 3.00 percent 4.75 percent 
Vermont  SRS  S  Yes  62/any; any/30  5 years  Entry age 8.25 percent 3.00 percent 5.25 percent 
Vermont  TRS  T  Yes  62/any; any/30  5 years  Entry age 8.25 percent 3.00 percent 5.25 percent 
Virginia  SRS  S, L, T  Yes  65/5; 50/30  5 years  Entry age 7.50 percent 2.50 percent 5.00 percent 
Washington  PERS  S, L  Yes  65/5; 65/10  5 yrs; 10 yrs  Hybrid 8.00 percent 3.50 percent 4.50 percent 
Washington  TRS  T  Yes  65/5; 65/10  5 yrs; 10 yrs  Hybrid 8.00 percent 3.50 percent 4.50 percent 
West Virginia  PERS  S, L  Yes  60/5; 55/R80  5 years  Entry age 7.50 percent 3.00 percent 4.50 percent 
West Virginia  TRS  T  Yes  60/5; 55/30; any/35  5 years  Entry age 7.50 percent 3.00 percent 4.50 percent 
Wyoming  WRS  S, L, T  Yes  60/4; R85  4 years  Entry age 8.00 percent 3.50 percent 4.50 percent 
Milwaukee  City  L  Yes  60/any; 55/30  4 years  Unit credit  8.50 percent 3.00 percent 5.50 percent 
Milwaukee  County  L  Yes  60/any; R75  5 years  County 8.00 percent 3.00 percent 5.00 percent 
Wisconsin  WRS  S, L, T  Yes  65/any; 57/30  Immediate  WRS 7.80 percent 4.10 percent 3.70 percent 
Sources:  2008 Comparative Study of Major Public Employee Retirement Systems prepared by Daniel Schmidt, Wisconsin Legislative Council in December 2009 (Revised in May 2010).   
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United States, the median number of years it takes to be fully vested in a state pension program 
is five years; Maine’s five year vesting period requirement, thus, is average.  
As seen in Table 5, the actuarial methods vary by state.  The actuarial method used by 
each plan is “a procedure for determining the present value of pension benefits that will be paid 
in the future and allocating that value and the cost of the benefits to specific time periods” 
(Schmidt, 2010).  Most of the states, including Maine, use the entry-age methodology; a minority 
of the states uses other methods such as the unit credit method or aggregate cost method. 
As discussed earlier in this report, the earnings assumption is a key metric that determines the 
states’ ability to fully fund their pension system.  The earnings assumption, or interest 
assumption is a projection of the percentage the invested funds will grow year over year.  
Maine’s interest assumption is 7.75 percent, compared to a median of 8 percent across states.  As 
discussed earlier, there is continued controversy surrounding the interest assumptions of state 
pension systems, as they do not necessarily account for economic upswings and downturns. 
Maine’s slightly less optimistic 7.75 percent is a small step towards more responsible resource 
management, but a lower estimated return on investment may insulate against unexpected 
investment losses.  Note, too, that some of the same states with the highest funded ratios (e.g. 
North Carolina, Nebraska, Florida and Georgia), also have earnings assumptions at the same rate 
or lower than Maine’s. 
 Wage inflation, shown in Table 5, column 9, is a projection of the rate at which invested 
earnings will grow on account of salary increases over time.  Maine’s wage inflation rate is a 
relatively high 4.5 percent, compared to the median across states of 3.5 percent.  Although Maine 
was conservative in terms of the interest assumption, when compared to the median, it is more 
aggressive than the median in terms of a wage inflation rate.   
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Table 6: Comparison of Active Employees with Beneficiaries & Annuitants (Current Recipients), 
State-Local Retirement Systems 2008 
State 
Fund 
Name 
Active 
Employees 
Number of 
Beneficiaries & 
Annuitants 
Ratio of Active Employees to Beneficiaries  
RATIO 
RANKING AMONG 
SYSTEMS (Highest=1) 
Alabama  ERS  87,247 34,175 2.55 11 
Alabama  TRS  141,528 66,928 2.11 32 
Alaska  PERS  28,850 24,082 1.20 81 
Alaska  TRS  8,531 10,026 0.85 85 
Arizona  SRS  227,730 92,673 2.46 15 
Arkansas  TRS  70,172 26,801 2.62 10 
Arkansas  PERS  44,340 23,555 1.88 46 
California  TRS  461,378 223,968 2.06 35 
California  PERS  836,914 468,898 1.78 58 
Colorado  PERA  190,367 80,965 2.35 19 
Connecticut  TRS  51,738 28,787 1.80 56 
Connecticut  SERS  53,196 38,093 1.40 76 
Delaware  SEPP  34,764 18,056 1.93 42 
Florida  FRS  683,302 276,252 2.47 13 
Georgia  TRS  225,024 78,633 2.86 8 
Georgia  ERS  75,293 35,579 2.12 31 
Hawaii  ERS  65,251 35,324 1.85 49 
Idaho  PERS  66,765 30,912 2.16 29 
Illinois  MRF  180,615 90,132 2.00 39 
Illinois  TRS  165,572 91,462 1.81 54 
Illinois  SERS  66,237 60,813 1.09 82 
Indiana  PERF  138,863 60,332 2.30 22 
Indiana  TRF  76,256 42,817 1.78 59 
Iowa  PERS  167,823 87,309 1.92 43 
Kansas  PERS  153,804 64,188 2.40 16 
Kentucky  CERS  95,394 43,001 2.22 26 
Kentucky  TRS  75,539 40,739 1.85 50 
Kentucky  ERS  52,478 37,711 1.39 77 
Louisiana  SERS  61,780 37,575 1.64 67 
Louisiana  TRSL  85,979 64,830 1.33 79 
Maine  PERS  51,402 34,182 1.50 74 
Maryland  SRPS  199,255 112,422 1.77 60 
Massachusetts  TRS  89,636 50,024 1.79 57 
Massachusetts  SERS  86,529 50,873 1.70 62 
Michigan  PSERS  278,642 167,265 1.67 66 
Michigan  MERS  37,135 23,995 1.55 71 
Michigan  SERS  28,568 48,078 0.59 87 
Milwaukee  City  11,581 11,082 1.05 83 
Milwaukee  County  4,837 7,308 0.66 86 
Minnesota  PERA  146,226 61,436 2.38 18 
Minnesota  MSRS  48,361 25,346 1.91 45 
Minnesota  TRA  76,938 47,190 1.63 68 
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Mississippi  PERS  165,733 73,540 2.25 23 
Missouri  LAGERS  31,424 13,356 2.35 20 
Missouri  PSRS  78,436 41,738 1.88 47 
Missouri  SERS  54,542 30,132 1.81 55 
Montana  PERS  28,293 16,627 1.70 63 
Montana  TRS  18,292 11,788 1.55 72 
Nebraska  SEPP21 17,200 410 41.95 1 
Nebraska  CEPP22 7,711 187 41.24 2 
Nebraska  SPP  37,832 15,339 2.47 14 
Nevada  PERS  106,203 33,479 3.17 3 
New Hampshire  NHRS  50,988 22,870 2.23 25 
New Jersey  PERS  319,182 133,017 2.40 17 
New Jersey  TPAF  142,887 68,479 2.09 34 
New Mexico  PERA  52,507 24,910 2.11 33 
New Mexico  ERA  63,698 31,192 2.04 36 
New York  TRS  274,901 136,706 2.01 38 
New York  ERS  528,435 328,726 1.61 69 
North Carolina  LGERS  127,959 42,408 3.02 4 
North Carolina  TSERS  338,490 145,855 2.32 21 
North Dakota  PERS  19,296 6,836 2.82 9 
North Dakota  TRF  9,561 6,317 1.51 73 
Ohio  PERS  374,002 166,516 2.25 24 
Ohio  STRS  173,327 126,506 1.37 78 
Oklahoma  TRS  88,678 45,238 1.96 40 
Oklahoma  PERS  45,120 26,033 1.73 61 
Oregon  PERS  198,626 98,066 2.03 37 
Pennsylvania  PSERS  272,690 173,540 1.57 70 
Pennsylvania  SERS  110,866 108,146 1.03 84 
Rhode Island  ERS  35,051 23,419 1.50 75 
South Carolina  SCRS  187,968 100,897 1.86 48 
South Dakota  SRS  37,707 19,321 1.95 41 
Tennessee  CRS  212,725 98,230 2.17 28 
Texas  MRS  100,459 34,123 2.94 6 
Texas  TRS  801,455 275,228 2.91 7 
Texas  ERS  134,626 72,678 1.85 51 
Utah  SRS  93,576 31,731 2.95 5 
Vermont  TRS  10,685 5,555 1.92 44 
Vermont  SRS  8,442 4,555 1.85 52 
Virginia  SRS  345,737 136,394 2.53 12 
Washington  PERS  158,022 71,244 2.22 27 
Washington  TRS  64,939 38,091 1.70 64 
West Virginia  PERS  35,491 20,912 1.70 65 
West Virginia  TRS  35,219 28,522 1.23 80 
Wisconsin  WRS  263,186 144,033 1.83 53 
Wyoming  WRS  35,021 16,275 2.15 30 
                                                 
21 Converted to individual cash balance plans from defined contribution plans 
22 Converted to individual cash balance plans from defined contribution plans 
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As shown in Table 6, there is a large range in terms of the number of employees and 
beneficiaries across states.  It is important to assess the ratio of employees to beneficiaries, 
especially when studying DB plans, as the employee contributions fund the immediate payouts 
of current beneficiaries.  Table 6 ranks the states; the state in first place (Nebraska) has the 
highest ratio of employees to beneficiaries.   
Table 7 shows a comparison of post-retirement features across state pension plans.  Many 
plans have provisions for post-retirement annuity adjustments to account for cost of living 
increases.  Just as rigorous planning for market shifts is important in funding pension plans, 
setting realistic predictions for adjustments due to inflation and increases in CPI is part of a 
larger strategy for better fiscal health of pension funds.  There are several types of provisions, 
including adjustments indexed to CPI, automatic percentage increase, investment surplus, and ad 
hoc or no increase (Schmidt, 2010).  Many states institute a cap on annual post retirement 
increases only past a certain amount (Massachusetts’ begins at $12,000), or institute a minimum 
level of increase (Idaho has a minimum of 1 percent).  In Maine’s case, however, adjustments are 
indexed to CPI and then simply capped at 4 percent.  The PERS benefit, additionally, is exempt 
up to $6,000 in Maine.  This is a relatively small amount of grace for Maine’s beneficiaries 
compared to other states who afford an exemption level more than twice that; many more exempt 
PERS benefits from taxation, entirely. Although exempt from federal individual income taxes, 
Maine's state employees and teachers must add their state retirement system contributions back 
into their income for taxation.  Notably, Maine is one of only six states that do not provide social 
security coverage for teachers and state employees; the other states are Massachusetts, Alaska, 
Colorado, Louisianan, Nevada, and Ohio.  An additional five states do not cover teachers but do 
cover state employees:  California, Illinois, Kentucky, Missouri, and Texas.  
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Table 7: Comparison of Pension Plan Post-Retirement Features, State-Local Retirement Systems 2008 
State 
Fund 
Name 
Employee 
Coverage23 
Social Security 
Coverage? Formula Multiplier Limitation  
Annual Post-Retirement 
Increases 
State Taxation of PERS 
Benefits  
Alabama  ERS  S, L  Yes  2.01 percent None  Ad hoc only  Benefits exempt  
Alabama  TRS  T  Yes  2.01 percent None  Ad hoc only  Benefits exempt  
Alaska  PERS  S, L  No  
N/A; defined contribution 
plan  None  
N/A: acct balance + invest 
earnings  No income tax law  
Alaska  TRS  T  No  
N/A; defined contribution 
plan  None  
N/A: acct balance + invest 
earnings  No income tax law  
Arizona  SRS  S, L, T  Yes  
2.1 percent (1st 20 yrs); 2.15 
percent (next 5 yrs); 2.2 
percent (next 5 yrs); 2.3 
percent over 30 yrs  80 percent FAS  
Excess earnings - 4 percent 
cap  Exempt to $2,500  
Arkansas  PERS  S, L  Yes  2 percent 100 percent FAS  3 percent Exempt to $6,000  
Arkansas  TRS  T  Yes  2.15 percent None  3 percent Exempt to $6,000  
California  PERS  S, L  Yes  
2 percent at 55; 2.5 percent at 
63 or older  65 yrs max  2 percent Benefits taxable  
California  TRS  T  No  
2 percent at 60; 2.4 percent at 
63  100 percent FAS  2 percent Benefits taxable  
                                                 
23 S = State, L = Local, T = Teachers 
45 
 
Colorado  PERA  S, L, T  No  2.50 percent 100 percent FAS  
Lesser of 3 percent, CPI, or 
10 percent of COLA fund 
assets  Exempt to $20,000/$24,000  
Connecticut  SERS  S  Yes  
1.33 percent + .5 percent over 
$48,800; 1.625 percent yrs 
over 35  None  
60 percent of CPI up to 6 
percent, 2.5 percent 
minimum  Benefits taxable  
Connecticut  TRS  T  No  2 percent 75 percent FAS  
Excess earnings - 1.5 
percent or 6 percent cap  Benefits taxable  
Delaware  SEPP  S, T  Yes  1.85 percent None  Ad hoc only  Exempt to $12,500  
Florida  FRS  S, L, T  Yes  
1.6 percent to 1.68 percent 
(age & yrs of service)  100 percent FAS  3 percent No state income tax  
Georgia  ERS  S  Yes  2 percent 
90 percent high 
yr  
CPI - 1.5 percent semi-
annual cap  Exempt to $35,000  
Georgia  TRS  T  Yes  2 percent 40 yrs max  
CPI - 1.5 percent semi-
annual cap  Exempt to $35,000  
Hawaii  ERS  S, L, T  Yes  2 percent None  2.50 percent Benefits exempt  
Idaho  PERS  S, L, T  Yes  2 percent 100 percent FAS  
CPI - 1 percent minimum 
to 6 percent max 
(conditional)  Benefits taxable  
Illinois  SERS  S  Yes  1.67 percent 75 percent FAS  3 percent Benefits exempt  
Illinois  TRS  T  No  2.20 percent 75 percent FAS  3 percent Benefits exempt  
Illinois  MRF  L  Yes  
1.67 percent (1st 15 yrs); 2 
percent (added yrs)  75 percent FAS  3 percent Benefits exempt  
Indiana  PERF  S, L  Yes  
1.1 percent + money purchase 
annuity  None  
Ad hoc only (1.5 percent 
presumed)  Benefits taxable  
Indiana  TRF  T  Yes  
1.1 percent + money purchase 
annuity  None  
Ad hoc only (1.5 percent 
presumed)  Benefits taxable  
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Iowa  PERS  S, L, T  Yes  
2 percent (1st 30 yrs); 1 
percent (next 5 yrs)  65 percent FAS  
Excess earnings - CPI; 3 
percent cap  
Exempt to $6,000, $12,000 
married  
Kansas  PERS  S, L, T  Yes  1.75 percent None  Ad hoc only  Benefits exempt  
Kentucky  ERS  S  Yes  1.97 percent None  1.50 percent Exempt to $41,110  
Kentucky  CERS  L  Yes  2 percent None  1.50 percent Exempt to $41,110  
Kentucky  TRS  T  No  
2.5 percent for up to 30 yrs; 3 
percent for over 30 yrs  100 percent FAS  1.50 percent Exempt to $41,110  
Louisiana  SERS  S  No  2.50 percent 100 percent FAS  
Excess earnings; CPI; 3 
percent cap  Benefits exempt  
Louisiana  TRSL  T  No  2.50 percent 100 percent FAS  CPI - 3 percent cap  Benefits exempt  
Maine  PERS  S, L, T  No  2 percent None  CPI - 4 percent cap  Exempt to $6,000  
Maryland  SRPS  S, L, T  Yes  1.82 percent 100 percent FAS  CPI - 3 percent cap  Exempt to $23,600  
Massachusetts  SERS  S  No  
.5 percent to 2.5 percent (age-
related)  80 percent FAS  
CPI - on 1st $12,000-
conditional, 3 percent cap  Benefits exempt  
Massachusetts  TRS  T  No  
.1 percent to 2.5 percent (age-
related) + 2 percent for each 
yr over 24  80 percent FAS  
CPI - on 1st $12,000-
conditional, 3 percent cap  Benefits exempt  
Michigan  SERS  S  Yes  1.50 percent None  
3 percent ($300 annual 
cap)  Benefits exempt  
Michigan  MERS  L  Yes  
1.3 percent to 2.5 percent 
(employer option)  
80 percent FAS 
for multipliers of 
2.25 percent and 
over  
3 plans - depending on 
employer agreement 
(generally 2.5 percent)  Benefits exempt  
Michigan  PSERS  T  Yes  1.50 percent None  3 percent Benefits exempt  
Minnesota  MSRS  S  Yes  1.70 percent None  
CPI - 2.5 percent cap plus 
investment surplus  Benefits taxable  
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Minnesota  PERA  L  Yes  1.70 percent None  
CPI - 2.5 percent cap plus 
investment surplus  Benefits taxable  
Minnesota  TRA  T  Yes  1.90 percent None  
CPI - 2.5 percent cap plus 
investment surplus  Benefits taxable  
Mississippi  PERS  S, L, T  Yes  
2 percent (1st 25 yrs); 2.5 
percent (added yrs)  100 percent FAS  3 percent Benefits exempt  
Missouri  SERS  S  Yes  
1.7 percent (and .8 percent to 
age 62 if R80 met)  None  
80 percent CPI - 5 percent 
cap  Exempt to $6,000/$12,000  
Missouri  LAGERS  L  Yes  
1 percent to 8 percent (varies 
by employer option)  None  CPI - 4 percent cap  Exempt to $6,000/$12,000  
Missouri  PSRS  T  No  
2.5 percent; 2.55 percent with 
31 or more yrs of service  100 percent FAS  
CPI - 5 percent cap; 80 
percent of original benefits 
lifetime cap  Exempt to $6,000/$12,000  
Montana  PERS  S, L  Yes  
1.785 percent; 2 percent with 
at least 25 yrs of service  None  3 percent Exempt to $3,600  
Montana  TRS  T  Yes  1.67 percent None  1.50 percent Exempt to $3,600  
Nebraska  SEPP S  Yes  None    Money purchase  Benefits taxable  
Nebraska  CEPP L  Yes  None    Money purchase  Benefits taxable  
Nebraska  SPP  T  Yes  2 percent None  CPI - 2.5 percent cap  Benefits taxable  
Nevada  PERS  S, L, T  No  2.67 percent 75 percent FAS  
2 percent to 5 percent 
(varies)  No income tax law  
New Hampshire  NHRS  S, L, T  Yes  
1.67 percent to 65; 1.515 
percent after 65  100 percent FAS  Ad hoc  Benefits exempt  
New Jersey  PERS  S, L  Yes  1.82 percent None  60 percent of CPI  Exempt to $15,000/$20,000  
New Jersey  TPAF  T  Yes  1.82 percent None  60 percent of CPI  Exempt to $15,000/$20,000  
New Mexico  PERA  S, L  Yes  3 percent 80 percent FAS  3 percent Benefits taxable  
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New Mexico  ERA  T  Yes  2.35 percent None  
50 percent of CPI - 2 
percent min; 4 percent cap  Benefits taxable  
New York  ERS  S, L  Yes  
1.67 percent (under 20 yrs); 2 
percent (over 20 yrs); 3.5 
percent (over 30 yrs)  None  
50 percent of CPI, max 3 
percent on 1st $18,000  Benefits exempt  
New York  TRS  T  Yes  Same as New York's ERS  None  
50 percent of CPI, max 3 
percent on 1st $18,000  Benefits exempt  
North Carolina  TSERS  S, T  Yes  1.82 percent None  Ad hoc  Exempt to $4,000/$8,000  
North Carolina  LGERS  L  Yes  1.85 percent None  Ad hoc  Exempt to $4,000/$8,000  
North Dakota  PERS  S, L  Yes  2 percent None  Ad hoc  Benefits taxable  
North Dakota  TRF  T  Yes  2 percent None  Ad hoc  Benefits taxable  
Ohio  PERS  S, L  No  
2.2 percent (1st 30 yrs); 2.5 
percent (added yrs)  100 percent FAS  3 percent cap  Benefits taxable  
Ohio  STRS  T  No  
2.2 percent (1st 35 yrs); 2.5 
percent (35 or more yrs)  100 percent FAS  3 percent cap  Benefits taxable  
Oklahoma  PERS  S, L  Yes  2 percent None  Ad hoc  Exempt to $10,000  
Oklahoma  TRS  T  Yes  2 percent None  Ad hoc  Exempt to $10,000  
Oregon  PERS  S, L, T  Yes  1.67 percent None  CPI - 2 percent cap  Benefits taxable  
Pennsylvania  SERS  S  Yes  2.50 percent 
100 percent high 
yr  Ad hoc  Benefits exempt  
Pennsylvania  PSERS  T  Yes  2.50 percent None  Ad hoc  Benefits exempt  
Rhode Island  ERS  S, T  Yes  
1.7 percent (1st 10 yrs); 1.9 
percent (2nd 10 yrs); 3 
percent (21-34 yrs); 2 percent 
(35+)  80 percent FAS  3 percent Benefits taxable  
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South Carolina  SCRS  S, L, T  Yes  1.82 percent None  CPI - 4 percent cap  $15,000 deduction  
South Dakota  SRS  S, L, T  Yes  1.70 percent None  3.10 percent No income tax law  
Tennessee  CRS  S, L, T  Yes  
1.5 percent + .25 percent FAS 
over SSIL  94.5 percent FAS CPI - 3 percent cap  Benefits exempt  
Texas  ERS  S  Yes  2.30 percent 100 percent FAS  Ad hoc  No income tax law  
Texas  TRS  T  No  2.30 percent None  Ad hoc  No income tax law  
Texas  MRS  L  Yes  None    
Up to 70 percent of CPI 
(employer option)  No income tax law  
Utah  SRS  S, L, T  Yes  2 percent None  CPI - 4 percent cap  Exempt to $7,500/$15,000  
Vermont  SRS  S  Yes  1.67 percent 50 percent FAS  
50 percent of CPI - 5 
percent cap  Benefits taxable  
Vermont  TRS  T  Yes  1.67 percent 50 percent FAS  
50 percent of CPI - 5 
percent cap  Benefits taxable  
Virginia  SRS  S, L, T  Yes  1.70 percent 100 percent FAS  CPI - 5 percent cap  Exempt to $12,000  
Washington  PERS  S, L  Yes  
2 percent; 1 percent + .25 
percent per yr after 20 yrs 
(non-contributory)  None  CPI - 3 percent cap  No income tax law  
Washington  TRS  T  Yes  
2 percent; 1 percent + .25 
percent per yr after 20 yrs 
(non-contributory)  None  CPI - 3 percent cap  No income tax law  
West Virginia  PERS  S, L  Yes  2 percent None  No  Exempt to $2,000  
West Virginia  TRS  T  Yes  2 percent None  No  Exempt to $2,000  
Wisconsin: 
Milwaukee  City  L  Yes  2 percent 70 percent FAS  
1.5 percent yrs 1-4; 2 
percent thereafter  Exempt for some  
Wisconsin: 
Milwaukee  County  L  Yes  2 percent 80 percent FAS  2 percent Exempt for some  
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Wisconsin  WRS  S, L, T  Yes  1.60 percent 70 percent FAS  
Investment earnings; 
reductions possible  Exempt for some  
Wyoming  WRS  S, L, T  Yes  
2.125 percent (1st 15 yrs); 
2.25 percent (added yrs)  None  CPI - 3 percent cap  No income tax law  
Sources:  2008 Comparative Study of Major Public Employee Retirement Systems prepared by Daniel Schmidt, Wisconsin Legislative Council in December 2009 (Revised in May 2010).   
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V.  Financing Trends and Progress 1 
 
As discussed earlier in the report, although some states have separate pension systems for 
state employees and teachers, Maine's state and local retirement system is a single, unified 
system administered by the Maine Public Employees Retirement System (MainePERS).2  
MainePERS is an independent state agency whose operation is the responsibility of a Board of 
Trustees whose composition is defined by state law and whose eight members must be confirmed 
by the Legislature (MainePERS, n.d., "Board of Trustees").  They, in turn, choose the System's 
Executive Director whose Office has administrative responsibility for the System and its 
operations, oversees actuarial work and investments, manages internal audits, and carries out the 
System's executive functions and day-to-day responsibilities (MainePERS, n.d., "The 
Organization").  By statute System assets and proceeds thereof are held, invested, and disbursed 
in trust for retiree benefits and cannot be appropriated for other purposes by the Legislature (ME 
Const., art. IX, § 18). 
All plans administered by MainePERS are of the defined benefit type, which means they 
provide eligible retired employees with lifetime pensions whose amounts are determined by 
statutory formulas.3  The State and Teacher's Retirement Program is the largest in both members 
covered and fiscal scope of the defined benefit plans, and as discussed previously, Maine does 
not participate in Social Security for state employees and public teachers. This means that the 
State does not contribute to Social Security income security on behalf of employees and that 
                                                            
1  This section of the report was written by Eric Davis. Mr. Davis also was responsible for compiling pension data 
from US Census files. 
2 In addition to administering the retirement system for state employees and teachers, MainePERS also oversees 
several smaller programs: the Judicial Program, the Legislative Program, and the Participating Local Districts (PLD) 
Consolidated Plan. 
3 MainePERS also operates a supplementary retirement savings defined contribution plan called MaineSTART, 
which is similar to a 401(k) plan in that contributions to the plan are specified but retirement benefits depend on 
the performance of the employee's investments. 
52 
 
employees do not earn any "social security credits," which contribute towards eligibility to 
receive Social Security income and disability benefits, while employed by the State. 4  The 
pension annuities paid to eligible retirees are made in lieu of Social Security under Section 
3121(b)(7)(F) of the Internal Revenue Code (IRC), and to maintain this exemption retiree 
benefits generally need to meet a minimum requirement such that, in line with IRC Section 
31.3212(b)(7)-2(e)(2)(i), they are "comparable to those provided in the Old-Age portion of the 
Old-Age, Survivor, Disability Insurance program under Social Security" (Social Security Online, 
2011).  Because of this exemption, the State is allowed to pay 5.5% of payroll for the State and 
Teacher's Retirement Program instead of the 6.2% rate required under Social Security.  
Employees, in contrast, pay a higher 7.65% of salary instead of 6.2%. 
5.1  Pension Financing: Trends by Source 
 The Maine Public Employees Retirement System (MainePERS) is financed through three 
revenue streams: employee contributions, employer contributions, and returns on invested 
system assets.  System assets are managed and invested by MainePERS's Office of the Executive 
Director. 
Employee contributions 
 Employee contributions to MainePERS involve each employee paying a specified 
percentage of salary (7.65% in FY2011).  Employee contribution levels for state employees and 
teachers are set by the Legislature.  Figure 1 shows annual employee payments into the 
Retirement System, adjusted to 2008 dollar values for meaningful comparison. 
                                                            
4 The Legislative and Judicial Programs also do not participate in Social Security.  PLD employees may or may not 
earn Social Security credits depending on whether their employer has a Social Security 218 Agreement or their 
employer has excluded their employee classification from MainePERS.  
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 Annual employee payments grew by 37.7% in inflation adjusted 2008 dollars between 
FY1993 and FY2007, an increase of approximately $44,110,000.  If the recession affected 
FY2008 is used as the terminating point, the percentage increase is 28.7% instead.  Either way, 
the general trend for this revenue stream over the past two decades is one of positive -- but not 
constant -- growth.  There are ups and downs in the size of yearly employee contributions, but 
the range these ups and downs fluctuate around has traveled upward. 
In the aggregate, total contributions valued at $2.4 billion in inflation adjusted 2008 
dollars were made by personnel working in state government and local schools in Maine between 
FY1993 and FY2008.  This accounted for approximately 14% of the Retirement System's total 
financing, as displayed by Figure 2 on the next page.  This may seem small in comparison to the 
employer contribution and investment earnings shares, but it is important to recognize that these 
dollars were derived solely from active employees whose numbers have remained relatively 
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static over this time period.  Former employees of state government and public schools cease 
making contributions once they leave public service, so the growth in this revenue stream and the 
assets it has raised are substantial.  
 
 
 
Employer Contributions 
 In contrast to employees, Maine State government must contribute: (1) the employer's 
annual share, which is an amount adequate to pay each retiree the benefit level promised and (2) 
an amount adequate to amortize the unfunded liability of MainePERS.  Between 1993 and 2008, 
annual contributions by the State of Maine comprised one-third of the growth in system assets 
(Figure 2).  This funding was designed to cover not only the employer share of financing current 
benefits that were accruing to state works and elementary and secondary education personnel but, 
even more significantly (dollar wise), to pay down (1) the long term unfunded liability and (2) 
borrowing from the system of $73 million in 1991. 
 
$2,356,849.17  
14%
$5,574,646.01 
33%
$9,119,945.11 
53%
Figure 2: MainePERS Receipts by Source for FY1993 ‐
FY2008 Combined (in Thousands of Real 2008 $)
Employee Contributions
Government Contributions
Investment Earnings
Source: US Census Bureau State & Local Public Retirement Systems Series. 
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Meeting Currently Accruing Obligations for Earned Benefit Retirements 
 The State's annual current contributions to MainePERS that are made on behalf of current 
employees are referred to as normal costs.  These costs reflect the annual value of retirement 
benefits earned during the fiscal year by current employees.  In other words, the annual normal 
cost is "the present value of future pension benefits earned by employees in the current year" 
(MainePERS, 2011, pp. 3).  In addition to contributing on behalf of State employees, Maine 
State government makes an annual contribution equal to the employers' share for Maine school 
districts.  Thus, normal costs include coverage for both state workers and elementary and 
secondary education personnel. 
 As described earlier, eligibility for a pension requires that a public employee work for a 
specified number of years, at which point the employee gains the status of being "vested" in the 
System.  Employees who leave public employment before gaining vested status are allowed to 
withdraw funds equivalent to the contributions they made to the System.  However, contributions 
made by the State on their behalf remain a part of System assets and continue to earn after the 
departure of the employee for whom funds were contributed.  As such, foregone potential 
retirement benefits are an essential component of the Retirement System's base financing and 
serve to reduce the magnitude of the State's required annual contribution. 
State Contributions Intended to Reduce the Unfunded Liability 
 As will be discussed further in the next section of the report, the Maine Public Employees 
Retirement System has a large, unfunded liability accumulated through underfinanced benefits 
earned prior to the current year by previous and current state employees and educators.  The 
large unfunded liability represents neglect of a crucial financial obligation that was allowed to 
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accumulate over many years while the State of Maine redirected promised resources to finance 
other endeavors. 
 Contributions to the System intended to amortize the longstanding unfunded liability are 
referred to as unfunded actuarial liability (UAL) costs.  The UAL is "the amount by which the 
actuarial liability for current and former employees is greater than pension assets" (ibid, p. 55).  
In other words, normal costs are the amount of new pension benefits earned by employees 
enrolled in the Retirement System in a given year, while the UAL cost is the annual financing 
required to amortize unfunded pension benefits owed to former and current employees.  Unlike 
paying off a mortgage, the annual contribution required to pay off an unfunded liability depends 
on (1) investment earnings during the previous fiscal year, which will have either increased or 
decreased the unfunded liability, (2) assumptions about earnings in the following year, and (3) 
deviations from actuarial assumptions that have increased or decreased the unfunded liability.  
Pension plans may include a provision to amortize the unfunded liability within a specified 
period.  When a system is following an amortization schedule for its unfunded liability, an 
annual required contribution (ARC) must be determined. 
 In the case of Maine, prior to 1995 the State's annual contributions toward the unfunded 
liability were a matter of Gubernatorial budget recommendations and Legislative decision 
making.  This changed in 1995 when an amendment to Maine's constitution was approved -- in 
large part because the State was not meeting its responsibility to pay off the UAL -- mandating 
full funding of the State and Teachers Retirement Program by the end of the State's fiscal year 
2028.5  MainePERS now calculates the ARC contribution to permit amortization by the deadline, 
with the ARC determined every two years to coincide with Maine's biennial budget process.  
                                                            
5 The other three defined benefit plans administered by MainePERS are on a "rolling" amortization schedule where 
the remaining UAL balance is amortized every year over the same fixed term.  The Legislative and Judicial plans use 
a 10‐year term, and the Participating Local Districts plan uses a 15‐year term. 
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Due to large losses in System holdings during the recent recession, the ARC payments for the 
current biennium have risen sharply.  This issues are explored further in the next section of the 
report, which considers comparative trends in the unfunded liability and pension system financial 
performance. 
Earnings on the Investment of Pension System Assets 
 Investments are made and managed by MainePERS's Office of the Executive Director 
using System assets from previous investment earnings and employer and employee 
contributions.  Most of these investments are made in seven major asset categories: publicly 
traded domestic stocks, publicly traded foreign stocks, cash and cash-like securities, publicly 
traded domestic bonds, infrastructure, private equity, and real estate (MainePERS, 2010, pp. 66).  
Returns on investments depend on the performance of the System's portfolios and, unlike 
employer and employee contributions, can be either positive or negative in a given year. 
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 While recent attention has focused on investment losses, a review of Figure 3 reveals that 
over seventeen years earnings from investments greatly exceeded losses caused by the 2001 
market crash and the onset of the most recent recession in 2008.  From FY1993 to FY2008 
MainePERS investments yielded approximately $10.75 billion in gross assets and lost $1.63 
billion for a net gain of around $9.12 billion.  Moreover, looking back to Figure 2 we see that 
investment earnings explain 53% of asset growth, making investments the largest source of 
financing for the Retirement System. 
 However, despite the good news above it is important to remember that investment 
earnings are volatile.  Figure 4 displays the year-to-year percentage changes in investment 
earnings which show greater responsiveness to recession-induced losses and market gains than 
the dollar trends suggest. 
 
 
 Annual earnings may be very large in years when the U.S. stock market does very well 
but negative in recessionary years.  These peaks and troughs mirror the U.S. economy.  Because 
System assets are withdrawn at a modest annual rate, these fluctuations can be weathered.  A 
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sound long-term investment plan does not require high earnings every year but rather strong 
positive earnings over time.  MainePERS appears to meet this criterion because, as we saw 
earlier, the Retirement System earned more than $9 billion from investments between FY1993 
and FY2008 and, despite a large loss between FY2008 and FY2009, the Retirement System's 
most recent Comprehensive Annual Financial Report shows that earnings growth resumed in 
FY2010.  So long as the U.S. economic recovery continues it is likely that annual investment 
earnings will rebound just as they have historically in the past.  For example, MainePERS's 
investments had negative returns totaling approximately $1.3 billion during FY2001 and FY2002 
because of the 2001 Recession, but in the following three years returns from investments yielded 
more than double the amount lost.  
5.2  Accumulated Pension System Assets 
 Retirement System assets are built upon three streams of revenue: investment earnings, 
employer (i.e. State Government) contributions, and employee contributions.  Employee 
contributions are the stablest and most predictable source, based as they are on a fixed 
percentage of salary, but they are also the smallest in the aggregate.  Employer contributions are 
the second most stable, with the annual required contribution (ARC) and fixed percentage of 
payroll providing an annual baseline, but because the exact amount is a matter of Gubernatorial 
recommendation and Legislative decision making it is hard to predict the size of the State's 
contribution year-to-year.  The employer contribution comprised approximately one-third of the 
growth in assets from FY1993 to FY2008.  Investment earnings, in contrast, accounted for over 
50% of new accumulated assets over the same time period but are volatile and unpredictable in 
the short-term and can decrease accumulated assets in years with negative investment returns.  
All three revenue sources provide significant funding for the Retirement System, and striking a 
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healthy and sustainable balance between them is important for the long-term health of the 
System.  
 
  
Figure 5 above displays the change in the Retirement System's accumulated assets from 
FY1992 through FY2008, a nearly two decade long period that included the tail-end of the early 
1990s recession, the collapse of the dot-com bubble, and the onset of the most recent recession.  
It was also a period of remarkable economic growth through the latter 1990s and mid-2000s, 
with the Dow Jones Industrial Average reaching a record 14,000+ high in October 2007. 
 As Figure 5 makes apparent, despite the ups and downs in the U.S. economy mentioned 
above accumulated System assets grew considerably over these seventeen years.  More 
specifically, System assets increased 209% from FY1992 to FY2008 in inflation adjusted 2008 
dollars, rising from approximately $2.64 billion to $10.6 billion.  This ties back in with Figure 
3's display of annual investment earnings over this time period and how, despite years with 
recession-induced investment losses, investment gains were more common and outweighed the 
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losses.  It also corroborates the wisdom of a long-term asset strategy; ups and downs in 
accumulated assets are virtually unavoidable when a source of funding as volatile as investment 
earnings is used, but because these cycles are unavoidable they can also be planned for by 
choosing a strategy for growth over time rather than striving for a riskier increase every year. 
 Returning to Figure 5, FY2007 represented a highpoint in the Retirement System's 
accumulated asset history and a striking $4 billion increase from FY2006.  If it is used as the 
endpoint rather than FY2008, System holdings increased by 321% instead of 209% over the time 
period.  However, hindsight and close examination suggest that the unprecedented gain seen in 
FY2007 was an anomaly produced by an overheated market and an accumulated asset level the 
State is unlikely to return to soon.  The presence of such a sudden and sizeable rise in earnings 
may even have indicated the problems that followed.  The FY2008 level of assets, in contrast, 
appears more in line with the continuing trend and was, interestingly enough, still greater than 
FY2006's level of System assets. 
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VI.  Pension Financing Performance and Trends1 
Pension financing issues are not a new topic of concern in Maine.  According to Bowles, 
the Maine State Retirement System had unfunded liabilities as early as 1924 (Bowles, 1954).  In 
1954, a report to the Maine State Legislature, Bowles wrote: 
The  funding methods  in  general  are providing  for  a proper  accumulation of  funds  to 
meet the future liabilities of the System with the exception of the amounts contributed 
for teachers’ benefits.  A considerable unfunded liability exists in respect to benefits for 
teachers hired prior  to 1924 and  the present  level of  contributions  for  the most part 
merely covers current pension payments.  
 In 1993, at a time when the unfunded liability was $1.3 billion, in the Dollars and Sense 
report on the Maine state budget, LaPlante and Devlin provided the Governor and Legislature 
with this sobering assessment:  
As the result of a lack of fiscal discipline, financing the state retirement system is nearing 
a  crisis  stage  that  extends well  beyond  the  funding  deficit  projected  for  the  current 
budget.   Any  further deferment or  slowdown  in amortizing  the unfunded  liability will 
worsen  our  already  inferior  relative  standing  among  the  states  and  add  millions  of 
dollars∙  to  the annual cost of  the system. Unless a concerted effort  is made  to payoff 
what we must in a timely way, our grandchildren could end up paying for benefits that 
accrued to our parents. (p. 80) 
  The question that arises is this: “Given long-term knowledge of funding inadequacies, 
how well has Maine done at improving the financial condition of the pension system?” This 
section of the report will consider pension system funding ratios to gauge financial performance.  
The following key ratio indicators of pension system fiscal health will be examined  
 The ratio of funded assets to unfunded obligations 
                                                            
1  This section of the report was researched and written by Tim Feeley.  Mr. Feeley undertook and completed the 
laborious and painstaking task of compiling data unfunded liability data for all state and local retirement systems 
shown in Table 8, which was required to analyze trends.  
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 The ratio of system assets to disbursements 
 The ratio of system receipts to disbursements and 
 The ratio of system earnings to disbursements 
6.1  Analysis of Funded Ratios:  System Assets Compared with System Obligations 
The ratio of funded assets to unfunded obligations, or what generally is referred to as the 
“funded ratio” is used to assess the capacity of a pension system to provide the benefits that have 
accrued to date to former and current employees.  
Data Sources 
The United States Census estimates that there are approximately 2,550 pension plans 
operated by some level of government in the United States.  The Census only collects data on 
roughly half of these systems.  The Public Fund Survey and Wilshire Consultants release a 
yearly survey of pension systems based on approximately 125 systems operated at various levels 
of government. The Pew Center on the States used a sample of 231 plans operated at statewide 
levels for their “Trillion Dollar Gap” study.  All of these methods have limitations, but all can be 
informative.   
The Pew Center on the States “Trillion Dollar Gap” report data was only current through 
2008, and the author collected data on the systems they identified for 2009.  Information for this 
analysis was collected for 218 pension systems reporting in 2009 and 143 systems reporting in 
2010.  Only Ohio has not released any data since 2008.  
Data was collected on the basis of the year the actuarial valuation was conducted, rather 
than when it was released.  Data was collected from publicly available sources; primarily 
Comprehensive Annual Financial Reports (CAFR) or yearly actuarial valuation reports. 
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However, not all plans released valuations in 2009 and/or 2010.  The 2009 and 2010 data is then 
compared to that reported by the Pew Center for 1997 to 2008. 
It is important to recognize that one state may have different pension systems for game 
wardens, teachers, state employees or state troopers, while some states have a unified system for 
all public sector employees.  Aggregating the systems into a statewide total is a way to make 
better comparisons from state to state.  Once data was collected for the systems in the sample, 
the data was aggregated for each state and a total was arrived at for these key pieces of data: 
 Actuarially Accrued Assets (A) 
 Actuarially Accrued Liabilities (B) 
 Unfunded Actuarially Accrued Liabilities (B-A) 
 Funded Ratio (A/B) 
The Maine Public Employees Retirement System’s Comprehensive Annual Financial 
Report consolidates all data for the State Employee and Teacher system and the participating 
local districts (municipalities).  The State of Maine Comprehensive Annual Financial Report, 
however, reflects only the portion of the retirement system that is obligated for the State 
Employee and Teacher plan.  The Pew Center on the States chose to use the Maine Public 
Employees Retirement System’s CAFR data, so that is what the author used to update the 2009 
and 2010 data used in this analysis.   
Data Adjustment 
The financing of public pension systems is looked at with long horizons and actuarial data 
is seldom reported in a timely manner.  Many funds report actuarial data for the fiscal year 
ending June 30, 2009 in their FY 2010 CAFR that is generally released six months after the close 
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Table 8: State Pension System Funding Ratios, 1997 to 2010 
 State  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007  2008  2009*  2010* 
Alabama  110.9%  101.0%  102.0%  103.1%  100.8%  96.7%  92.7%  89.6%  83.7%  82.3%  79.4%  77.1%  73.9%   N/A 
Alaska  101.3%  102.6%  104.3%  100.4%  98.5%  72.5%  69.5%  67.4%  64.0%  74.3%  74.2%  75.7%  60.9%   N/A 
Arizona  116.7%  119.9%  117.7%  121.7%  117.8%  108.0%  99.4%  92.9%  86.1%  84.7%  80.7%  80.2%  77.3%  75.8% 
Arkansas  97.4%  99.9%  101.4%  101.4%  99.6%  95.6%  89.8%  86.4%  81.7%  82.2%  87.2%  87.2%  77.5%  74.8% 
California  105.2%  113.8%  118.1%  115.5%  106.0%  96.3%  86.5%  86.4%  86.9%  87.4%  87.5%  86.9%  80.7%   N/A 
Colorado  91.6%  96.5%  103.1%  105.2%  98.6%  88.3%  75.6%  70.6%  73.3%  74.1%  75.1%  69.8%  70.1%   N/A 
Connecticut*  63.7%  65.1%  65.1%  72.1%  72.1%  69.0%  66.1%  60.0%  59.2%  56.5%  56.6%  61.6%  57.5%  53.4% 
Delaware  96.3%  99.8%  106.3%  108.1%  104.9%  102.6%  100.5%  97.6%  96.3%  96.4%  98.5%  98.2%  94.4%  92.0% 
Florida  91.3%  106.0%  113.5%  118.1%  117.9%  115.0%  114.2%  112.1%  107.3%  101.5%  101.8%  101.4%  87.1%  86.6% 
Georgia  90.4%  96.5%  98.2%  102.8%  103.5%  102.0%  101.1%  100.3%  98.0%  96.2%  94.6%  91.6%  87.1%   N/A 
Hawaii  N/A  N/A  93.6%  94.4%  90.6%  84.0%  75.9%  71.7%  68.7%  65.0%  67.5%  68.8%  64.6%   N/A 
Idaho  95.2%  107.3%  110.3%  114.4%  95.7%  84.1%  83.0%  91.0%  93.5%  94.9%  105.1%  93.3%  73.7%  78.6% 
Illinois  70.1%  72.1%  73.0%  74.7%  63.1%  53.5%  48.2%  60.9%  60.3%  60.5%  62.6%  54.3%  50.6%  45.4% 
Indiana  N/A  61.1%  64.0%  66.8%  68.6%  66.3%  69.0%  68.9%  67.4%  69.2%  70.5%  72.4%  66.4%   N/A 
Iowa  93.9%  95.3%  97.0%  97.7%  97.2%  92.6%  89.6%  88.6%  88.7%  88.4%  90.2%  89.0%  81.2%  81.4% 
Kansas  83.3%  83.0%  86.0%  88.3%  84.8%  77.6%  75.2%  69.8%  68.8%  69.4%  70.8%  58.8%  63.7%   N/A 
Kentucky  94.0%  96.9%  104.6%  110.6%  101.8%  94.4%  88.3%  82.8%  76.2%  69.7%  67.8%  63.8%  58.2%  54.3% 
Louisiana  68.4%  72.6%  75.3%  79.0%  78.3%  73.6%  68.4%  62.7%  64.2%  67.1%  70.4%  69.6%  60.0%  55.9% 
Maine  63.1%  68.7%  74.8%  79.5%  78.4%  77.0%  74.4%  74.8%  76.0%  77.1%  79.7%  79.7%  72.6%  70.4% 
Maryland  86.0%  90.3%  96.7%  100.8%  97.9%  94.4%  92.9%  91.8%  87.9%  82.5%  80.1%  78.4%  64.9%  64.0% 
Massachusetts  81.0%  81.0%  87.3%  84.0%  83.1%  70.4%  74.7%  73.1%  72.3%  75.8%  79.2%  63.0%  67.8%  67.8% 
Michigan  102.7%  99.1%  101.1%  101.6%  99.1%  93.3%  87.4%  84.2%  79.7%  87.1%  88.3%  83.6%  80.4%   N/A 
Minnesota  101.2%  102.8%  101.5%  102.1%  101.4%  96.8%  92.3%  90.6%  87.5%  84.8%  81.9%  81.4%  72.8%  75.7% 
Mississippi  79.5%  84.5%  82.4%  82.4%  87.4%  83.2%  78.8%  74.7%  72.2%  73.3%  73.5%  72.8%  67.2%  64.2% 
Missouri  95.5%  96.4%  98.5%  100.3%  97.1%  93.0%  81.9%  81.1%  81.5%  81.6%  83.2%  82.9%  78.3%  76.2% 
Montana  79.3%  83.0%  83.0%  102.5%  102.5%  90.8%  90.8%  79.7%  77.7%  80.5%  84.1%  83.9%  74.3%  70.0% 
Nebraska  100.5%  106.7%  86.9%  91.4%  90.1%  96.0%  92.1%  88.9%  87.6%  88.7%  92.1%  91.5%  87.6%   N/A 
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 State  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007  2008  2009*  2010* 
New 
Hampshire  89.2%  107.0%  89.4%  89.9%  85.0%  82.1%  75.0%  71.3%  60.5%  61.6%  67.2%  68.0%  58.3%  58.5% 
New Jersey  102.4%  105.7%  109.7%  111.4%  109.2%  101.4%  93.5%  87.2%  81.6%  77.5%  76.0%  72.6%  62.0%  62.3% 
New Mexico  82.0%  84.4%  90.1%  96.0%  98.7%  97.7%  92.2%  87.3%  83.8%  81.9%  81.5%  82.7%  76.2%  72.4% 
New York  114.1%  127.5%  128.2%  122.1%  121.9%  120.4%  99.4%  101.0%  103.1%  104.3%  105.9%  107.4%  95.2%   N/A 
North Carolina  98.9%  103.6%  107.7%  109.7%  108.8%  106.4%  106.0%  106.0%  104.8%  104.2%  103.4%  99.3%  96.7%   N/A 
North Dakota  100.1%  98.6%  97.0%  107.6%  102.6%  97.2%  90.9%  86.5%  82.0%  81.5%  85.7%  87.0%  81.5%  72.4% 
Ohio**  88.8%  92.4%  94.1%  96.1%  96.2%  81.2%  79.2%  80.6%  79.4%  80.4%  86.8%  78.3%  N/A  N/A  
Oklahoma  57.8%  63.9%  65.3%  69.5%  67.4%  65.9%  66.4%  60.6%  60.5%  59.6%  62.0%  60.7%  64.0%  62.6% 
Oregon  93.3%  93.3%  98.8%  97.6%  106.8%  91.0%  97.0%  96.2%  104.2%  110.5%  112.2%  80.2%  85.8%   N/A 
Pennsylvania  105.8%  111.3%  120.6%  126.7%  115.0%  105.6%  99.7%  92.8%  86.6%  84.9%  89.5%  87.0%  80.8%   N/A 
Rhode Island  75.3%  77.9%  83.0%  81.0%  77.6%  72.6%  63.9%  59.5%  55.9%  53.7%  56.4%  61.1%  61.8%  N/A  
South Carolina  91.0%  93.5%  98.2%  89.3%  87.7%  86.3%  83.4%  80.8%  72.9%  71.0%  71.1%  70.1%  68.7%   N/A 
South Dakota  95.2%  96.2%  97.4%  96.4%  96.8%  96.9%  97.3%  97.9%  96.8%  97.0%  97.5%  97.4%  91.7%  96.1% 
Tennessee  99.1%  99.1%  98.6%  98.6%  98.3%  98.3%  98.6%  98.6%  98.7%  98.7%  95.1%  95.1%  89.9%   N/A 
Texas  100.0%  104.5%  103.6%  107.0%  102.8%  97.2%  94.9%  92.7%  88.3%  88.5%  90.1%  90.7%  84.5%  83.4% 
Utah  91.0%  95.5%  102.9%  104.7%  102.7%  92.8%  94.7%  92.4%  93.2%  95.8%  96.0%  84.1%  86.6%  85.7% 
Vermont  86.0%  89.7%  91.1%  91.9%  92.2%  94.1%  93.8%  94.3%  94.8%  92.0%  95.6%  87.8%  72.8%  74.6% 
Virginia  79.4%  87.4%  94.4%  103.6%  106.0%  100.4%  95.2%  89.3%  80.8%  80.2%  81.8%  83.5%  80.1%   N/A 
Washington  N/A  113.4%  120.5%  125.9%  124.3%  116.3%  105.7%  104.1%  97.6%  99.6%  99.2%  100.3%  92.2%   N/A 
West Virginia  N/A  46.3%  45.9%  47.0%  44.3%  39.7%  38.7%  43.4%  48.6%  54.7%  70.4%  63.6%  55.9%   N/A 
Wisconsin  94.7%  95.1%  95.8%  96.0%  96.5%  97.1%  99.2%  99.4%  99.5%  99.6%  99.6%  99.7%  99.8%   N/A 
Wyoming  N/A  N/A  N/A  115.3%  103.0%  92.4%  92.5%  86.1%  95.1%  94.9%  94.5%  79.3%  79.3%  88.8% 
National AVG  90.6%  93.0%  95.1%  97.7%  95.3%  89.6%  85.9%  83.7%  81.8%  82.0%  83.5%  80.6%  75.3%  71.9% 
 
Notes: Data is aggregated for states with more than one pension plan. N/A stands for "Missing Data". 
1997 to 2008 Data was compiled by the Pew Center on the States; 2009 and 2010 was compiled by the Author 
* No Actuarial Valuation was conducted for any CT plans in 2009.  2009 figure is an average of the 2008 and 2010 data
** Ohio’s 2008 data was compiled by the author 
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of the fiscal year.  Data was organized based on the year of the actuarial valuation, rather than 
the year the data was reported.  That is why there are so many more non-reporting states for 
FY2010.  You can look for many of these systems to release FY2010 pension data in the fall of 
2011 – a year and a half after the actuarial snapshot was taken. 
The author of this section used the actuarial value of assets and liabilities, rather than the 
market value of assets.  GASB 25 only requires reporting of actuarial assets and liabilities. The 
actuarial process “smoothes” market fluctuations in order to reduce volatility in determining 
annual required contributions.  The actuarial values are the most commonly cited statistics in the 
literature.  Due to the smoothing process, where market gains or losses are phased in over a 
period of usually three years, the impact of the market performance is muted in the 2009 and 
2010 actuarial values than if market values were observed.   
Analysis  
On the preceding page Table 8 shows the funded status of state pension systems from 1997 
through 2008.  Because most recent analyses consider pension funding as of 2009 and later, let 
us begin there. A review of the data in the table shows a sharp drop in funding ratios for 2009, 
which reflects the significant impact of market losses on most systems’ investments.  Review of 
the 2010 ratios shows that the effects of the Great Depression lingered and in some cases further 
eroded pension system assets.   
 In 2009 there were only 19 states with a funding ratio of 80% or better and no state is 
overfunded. 
 The national average for funding ratio dropped nearly 5 points to 75.3% from 2008 to 
2009. 
68 
 
 Maine’s funded ratio fell nearly 7 points to 72.6% between 2008 and 2009, then fell 
again in 2010 to 70.4%--its lowest point since 1998. 
Figure 6: Distribution of States by Funding Ratio – All States 
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Figure 7: 2009 Distribution of States by Funding Level 
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Figure 8 Funding Ratios 1997 to 2009 
 
  
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009*
National AVG 90.6% 93.0% 95.1% 97.7% 95.3% 89.6% 85.9% 83.7% 81.8% 82.0% 83.5% 80.6% 75.3%
Maine 63.1% 68.7% 74.8% 79.5% 78.4% 77.0% 74.4% 74.8% 76.0% 77.1% 79.7% 79.7% 72.6%
New England AVG 76.4% 81.5% 81.8% 83.0% 81.4% 77.5% 74.6% 72.2% 69.8% 69.4% 72.4% 70.2% 65.1%
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Tables 9 and 10 illustrate the distribution of states according to the level of their funding 
ratio in 2008 and in 2009.  Looking at the change from 2008 to 2009 shows how the onset of the 
Great Recession began to impact overall funding levels.  In 2009, no state is fully funded, all 
states have less than a 100 percent funding ratio, despite three states being over the 100% 
threshold in 2008.  In 2009, nineteen states are better than 80% funded; the mark considered 
being healthy by the GAO. (GAO2007) Twenty-seven states were above the 80% mark in 2008. 
Table 9  Funding Ratio Changes 1997 to 2009 
  
Funding Ratios ‐ 1997 to 2009 
Ratio  Percent Change 
1997  2009  1997 to 2009 
Maine  63.13%  72.64%  13.1%
Nat'l Avg  90.61%  75.3%  ‐20.4%
New Eng. Avg.  76.4%  65.1%  ‐17.3%
 
This table isolates the beginning and end years of data to show progress over time.  This 
highlights the progress of the state of Maine to improve its funding status over the period and the 
degradation that went on in the region and in the nation.  Maine improved its funding ratio 
13.1% from 1997 to 2009.  Meanwhile, the national average was down 20.4% and the New 
England average was down 17.3%. 
Table  10  Funding Ratio Changes 2008 to 2009 
  
Funding Ratios ‐ 2008 to 2009 
Ratio  Percent Change 
2008  2009  2008 to 2009 
Maine  79.65%  72.64%  ‐9.7%
Nat'l Avg.  80.58%  72.8%  ‐10.6%
New Eng. Avg.  70.2%  65.1%  ‐7.7%
 
72 
 
 
Figure 9 
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The preceding table considered a shorter time frame: 2008 to 2009.  This time period 
captures the sudden drop off in investment due to market losses from the Great Recession.  
Maine’s drop off in funding ratio as a percentage was not as severe as the national mark, but 
somewhat worse than the New England Average. 
Table 11:  Funding Ratio Changes 2009 to 2010 
  
Funding Ratios ‐ 2009 to 2010 
Ratio  Percent Change 
2009  2010  2009 to 2010 
Maine  72.64%  70.38%  ‐3.2%
Nat'l Avg.  75.3%  71.9%  ‐4.6%
New Eng. Avg.  65.1%  64.9%  ‐0.3%
 
The above table is based upon incomplete data, but it can be informative.  The 2010 data only 
reflects ratios from 28 states for the national figure and it does not include Rhode Island in the 
New England average.  However, the general trend is that after the big drop in funding ratios 
from 2008 to 2009, as seen above, the worst may be over for 2010. 
During 2010, investment losses began to be recouped nationwide.  However, pension 
systems employ a method known as “actuarial smoothing.”  This refers to the process of phasing 
in market gains and losses over a number of years.  This typically prevents the “annual required 
contribution” (ARC) from fluctuating widely from year-to-year and increases predictability for 
state budget writers.  However, it also means that the pain of the Great Recession will be phased 
in over a number of years, even as equity markets level and climb.  Since the unusually large 
reduction in covered obligations that accompanied the Great Recession may prove to have been 
transitory, systems may choose to restart calculations rather than using recession years in 
smoothing formulas. 
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A Longer View on Pension Funding Progress 
Looking back, before the onset of the recession, we see that there was evidence of strong 
improvement in many states.  Although the expected rates of return used by states have been 
criticized as being too optimistic, with the growth rates of the 1990s characterized as “never to 
be seen again,” returns on investment during the mid-2000s were very strong, as the following 
graph reflects.  In inflation-adjusted dollars, holdings of all US retirement systems tracked by the 
US Bureau of the Census increased dramatically between 1989 and 2009, more than tripling in 
value over the twenty year period.  While holdings include employer and employee 
contributions, the major portion of growth observed is attributable to investment gains. 
 
Figure 10
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A review of trends shown earlier in Table 8 reveal that by 2008 there were 27 states with a 
funding ratio of 80% or better and 3 states that had ratios above 100%.  On the next page and 
using the same data, Figure 11 tracks Maine’s funding ratio as a percent of the mean. 
Figure 11: Maine's Funding Ratio as a percent of the US Mean 
 
This graph illustrates the change in funding status over time using the data from the Pew Center 
between 1997 and 2008 and the author’s research on funding status for 2009. This show’s that 
Maine started well below the national and regional funding levels, but steadily made progress 
until the market downturn in 2009. Reaching a high of 98.8% of the US mean funding level, 
Maine has made continued and steady progress in this metric.  Over the time period data was 
collected for the only year Maine lost ground was from 2008 to 2009.  When this data is 
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compared to above data, we can see that as Maine’s funding ratio crept upwards, the national 
mean was slipping, so this is consistent. 
Figure 12: Comparison of Maine UAL to New England and Nation  
 
Figure 12 uses a technique known as indexing as a way to compare changes in the size of 
the Unfunded Actuarial Liability (UAL) over a period of time.  By creating a common starting 
point we can track the changes in the relative size of UALs against one another.  We can see that 
Maine did not shrink the size of the UAL by any great measure between 1997 and 2008 and it 
ticked upward demonstrably in 2009.  However, the state’s position should be considered against 
the explosive growth of UAL’s nationally and in New England in the period from 2001 to 2009.  
By keeping relatively flat growth, Maine has bucked a national trend.  Recovery of investment 
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value as the economy recovers should help Maine to achieve the 80% funded level recommended 
by the Government Finance Officers Association. 
6.2  Financial Performance Ratios 
Another means used to track pension system financial performance is to compute ratios 
based on contributions to the system, disbursements (which include withdrawals by people 
leaving the system, payment to beneficiaries, and system operating costs), and earnings on 
investments.  This section of the financial analysis focuses on three key ratios:     
The ratios were computed using data collected by the US Census Bureau, whose analysts 
compile data on hundreds of pension systems in the states. Some states will have dozens of 
municipalities each responsible for managing public employee pension systems, while Maine 
operates a single, unified system. In states where multiple pensions systems exist, the data is 
aggregated by the Census Bureau to show a state total.   The Census data was compiled by 
Professor Josie LaPlante; ratios for 1980-1989 appear in her report to the State: Dollars and 
Sense: Maine State Budgeting at a Crossroads.  The ratios were updated by her for more recent 
years.  I used her database to analyze trends.  Table 12 shows trends in each of the three ratios.  
Receipts to Disbursement Ratios 
Pension systems are funded through two primary means; payroll contributions from 
employees and employers and through investment earnings of those contributions.  Those two 
sources are required to fund the disbursement of pensions to qualified persons.  The first ratio, 
cash receipts as a proportion of cash disbursements, measures the degree to which cash inflows 
from contributions and investment earnings exceed cash outflows.  The data from the Census 
Bureau shows that the systems assets and earnings to disbursement ratios have steadily increased 
since the early 1990s.  However, also see that the Maine State Retirement System is highly  
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Table 12:  Comparative View of Maine's Public Employee Retirement System's 
Financial Performance, 1982 - 2008  
Comparison 
Indicators 
Ratio of Receipts 
to 
Disbursements 
Ranking 
Among 
States 
Ratio of 
Earnings to 
Disbursements 
Ranking 
Among 
States 
Ratio of 
System  
Assets to 
Disbursements 
Ranking 
Among 
States 
19
82
 
Maine 1.64   0.41   3.68   
Mean of States 2.78   0.992   14.11   
Maine as % Mean 59%   41%   26%   
              
19
89
 
Maine 2.46 40 0.89 45 9.64 47 
MEAN of States 3.07   1.68   19.36   
Maine as % Mean 80%   53%   50%   
              
19
92 Maine 1.81 47 0.64 48 9.56 49 
MEAN 3.03   1.80   18.96   
Maine as % Mean 60%   36%   50%   
              
19
93
 
Maine 1.96 41 0.61 45 10.00 47 
MEAN 2.72   1.54   19.17   
Maine as % Mean 72%   40%   52%   
              
19
94 Maine 1.99 42 0.89 45 7.16 49 
MEAN 2.60   1.54   17.54   
Maine as % Mean 77%   58%   41%   
              
19
95
 
Maine 1.78 43 0.58 47 9.40 49 
MEAN 2.47   1.40   19.02   
Maine as % Mean 74%   42%   50%   
               
19
96
 
Maine 2.186 40 1.000 44 10.31 48 
MEAN 2.97   1.96   19.50   
Maine as % Mean 74%   51%   53%   
              
19
97 Maine 3.89 15 2.72 16 10.93 49 
MEAN 3.26   2.25   21.19   
Maine as % Mean 119%   121%   52%   
              
19
98 Maine 4.01 18 2.83 18 19.02 33 
MEAN 3.51   2.59   22.99   
Maine as % Mean 114%   110%   83%   
19
9 9 Maine 3.24 22 2.04 27 20.00 33 
MEAN 3.14   2.28   23.07   
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Maine as % Mean 103%   89%   87%   
              
20
00
 
Maine 2.92 29 1.88 37 20.97 31 
MEAN 3.60   2.81   23.74   
Maine as % Mean 81%   67%   88%   
              
20
01
 
Maine -0.48 45 -1.50 50 17.96 37 
MEAN 1.05   0.31   20.98   
Maine as % Mean -46%   -486%   86%   
              
20
02 Maine 0.08 23 -1.26 40 16.14 34 
MEAN -0.06   -0.76   18.88   
Maine as % Mean -152%   167%   85%   
              
20
03
 
Maine 1.84 11 0.84 12 17.38 25 
MEAN 1.22   0.53   17.40   
Maine as % Mean 151%   158%   100%   
              
              
20
04 Maine 3.49 17 2.53 19 18.17 23 
MEAN 3.25   2.55   18.35   
Maine as % Mean 107%   99%   99%   
               
20
05 Maine 2.95 10 2.07 14 18.14 24 
MEAN 2.46   1.78   18.56   
Maine as % Mean 120%   116%   98%   
               
20
06 Maine 2.40 23 1.51 33 18.26 27 
MEAN 2.49   1.82   18.86   
Maine as % Mean 97%   83%   97%   
              
20
07
 
Maine 3.906 14 3.056 17 24.72 9 
MEAN 3.48   2.80   20.31   
Maine as % Mean 133%   139%   107%   
              
20
08 Maine 0.274 31 -0.502 28 17.57 24 
MEAN 0.46   -0.25   17.60   
Maine as % Mean 60%   202%   100%   
 
dependent on the performance of the stock market – more so than other states.  The state’s rank 
for the ratio of receipts to disbursements and ratio for earnings to disbursements and ratio for 
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assets to disbursements all crept from the bottom rung of the fifty states to the middle or better – 
except for recessionary periods.   
Figure 13: Trends in the Ratio of Receipts to Disbursements 
 
Figure 13 traces the trend in the ratio of receipts to disbursements from 1982 to 2008.  A 
receipt, in this instance, refers to payroll contributions from employees and employers as well as 
investment earnings.  We can see that recessionary periods impact the ratio significantly, falling 
from highs of nearly 4 to 1 in the best of times to nearly 1 to 1 during recessions.  During these 
recessionary periods either more or essentially the same amount is paid out to qualified pension 
recipients as is contributed or earned by asset holdings.  Generally the ratios are higher post-1996 
than in previous years.  
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1 Sources: 1982 and 1989 data points from Dollars & Sense, Maine State Budgeting at a Crossroads; 
all other ratios computed from U.S. Census Bureau Finances of Retirement Systems series.
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Figure 14: Trends in Ratio of Earnings to Disbursements 
 
Figure 7 illustrates the trend in the ratio between investment earnings and fund disbursements.  
As with the prior figure, the economic environment has a major impact on the size of this ratio.  
Recessionary periods have a major impact on the health of this indicator, showing that in these 
years more is paid out than is brought in.  However, there are many more years of positive 
growth than negative. 
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Figure 15: Trends in Ratio of System Holdings to Disbursements 
 
Figure 15 illustrates the overall ratio of system holding to disbursements.  As we see here, again 
the impact of recessionary periods has a major impact on the holdings of the system.  While the 
trend is toward a higher ratio of holdings to disbursements, the recessions of 2001 and 2008 have 
major impacts.  As well, the jump in the size of the ratio between 1998 and 2000 and from 2006 
to 2007 indicate a very hot stock market that inflated asset holdings – only to have the air let out 
when the bubble burst the following year. 
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Figure 16: Maine’s Ranks for Ratio of Receipts to Disbursements, 1992‐2008 
 
Figure 16 tracks Maine’s national ranking for its ratio of receipts to disbursements.  Here we 
notice that the trend has improved since the early 1990’s when the Maine Retirement System 
was routinely in the bottom fifth of states.  Above figures illustrated how the ratios dropped 
significantly during recessions and here we see a similar phenomenon.  Not only were the 
holdings impacted negatively, the state’s rank dropped as well.  This would indicate that the 
State is overly reliant on investment earnings than other states. 
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Figure 17: Maine’s Ranks for Ratio of Earnings to Disbursements, 1992‐2008 
 
In Figure 17 the ratio of earnings to disbursements is graphed to show Maine’s ranking among 
the states.  We see that there is a general trend toward improvement in the state’s position from 
when it was nearly last in the early 1990s to being in the middle from 2003 onward.  However, 
again we see that the state’s ranking is hugely impacted by the performance of the stock market.  
All states rely on earnings to fund their pension systems, so this would call into question why 
Maine appears to be impacted more than other states.  
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Figure 18: Maine’s Ranks for Ratio of Assets to Disbursements, 1992‐2008 
 
The ratio of system assets to disbursements, the amount of money in the fund compared to how 
much is paid out, is illustrated in figure 18.  Again, here we can see that Maine has made steady 
progress in bolstering the amount of money in the fund compared to the amount that is disbursed 
as compared to other states.  The state has improved its ranking here considerably since the early 
1990s.  However, yet again this progress is tempered by the fact that the state’s ranking is 
adversely impacted during recessionary periods more than other states.  If all states relied on 
system assets to the extent that Maine does, these rankings would not fluctuate as much as they 
do. 
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Figure 19: Comparison of Maine to US Mean, Ratio of Assets to Disbursements, 1992‐2008 
 
Figure 19 compares Maine’s ratio of assets to disbursements as measured as a percent of the 
national mean - 100% equals the national mean.   
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Figure 20: Trends in the Ratio of Assets to Disbursements, Maine Compared with US Mean 
and Dow Jones Industrial Average, 1992‐2008 
 
Figure 20 combines two measures as a way to compare the State’s progress and the role that the 
stock market may have on system holdings.  The line on the chart in figure 20 is the Down Jones 
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Industrial Average.  As the state’s position improved, moving toward the national mean, we can 
see that the DJIA climbed as well.   
Figure 21: Trends in the Ratio of Assets to Disbursements, Maine Compared with the Dow 
Jones Industrial Average, 1992‐2008 
 
 
Figure 21 illustrates a comparison of the Dow Jones Industrial Average to the ratio of System 
Assets to Disbursements of the Maine State Retirement System.  Again, this chart helps to 
visualize the impact of the stock market performance on the holdings of the fund.  The fund 
generally improved its position in terms of holdings to disbursements in line with the 
performance of the stock market.  This comparison also tracks the result in Figures 20. 
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Comment by Josie LaPlante:  This excellent graphical analysis reveals quickly that large 
investment returns during good times have been the State’s major means of financing the 
unfunded pension liability.  When the economy has s tumbled, as it did in 2001 and 2008, 
significant system losses occurred.  The robustness of the system could be enhanced through a 
stronger emphasis on the state’s annual contribution, in particular, ensuring that substantial 
contributions are made annually regardless of expected investment gains.  The large unfunded 
liability has accrued because the State of Maine neglected to fund in a timely manner promises 
made to former and current employees. Solving the financing shortfall is the responsibility of the 
State, since the State created the problem.  Punting this responsibility to the vagaries of the stock 
market and more recently to employees is hardly fiscally accountable behavior. 
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VII.  Trends in State Contributions  
and the Adequacy of System Assets1 
  In 1993, writing in Dollars and Sense: Maine State Budgeting at a Crossroads, LaPlante 
admonished the State for failing to finance adequately this important long term financial 
obligation.  "Despite gains during the 1980's, Maine has not 'caught up' [on the unfunded 
liability].  As of 1990, the unfunded liability hovered above $1.3 billion, an increase from a level 
of $1.2 million two years before.  Deferments of required contributions of more than $73 million 
during fiscal years 1991 and 1992 further boosted the long term liability, and additionally, have 
served to increase the annual costs for years into the future because not only the current dollars 
deferred but the interest earnings that would have accrued on that investment will need to be 
made up" (pp. 73).  LaPlante concluded her analysis of Maine's Public Employees Retirement 
System (MainePERS) by urging serious attention to getting the pension system on stronger 
footing: "As a result of a lack fiscal discipline, financing the state retirement system is nearing a 
crisis stage that extends well beyond the funding deficit projected for the current budget...Unless 
a concerted effort is made to payoff what we must in a timely way, our grandchildren could end 
up paying for benefits that accrued to our parents" (pp. 80).   
Despite this and other warnings, the State has not been especially proactive in its efforts 
to retire the unfunded actuarial liability.  It is important to note the opportunity cost of 
MainePERS underfunding, which occurs in the form of foregone investment earnings.  Had the 
unfunded liability been reduced sooner or, even more desirable, had full funding been achieved, 
the value of System assets available for investment would have been much greater than what has 
actually been available through lower ARC payments.  Earnings on investments would have 
                                                            
1  This section was written by Eric Davis. 
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been able to play a stronger role in financing the System and would continue to do so when the 
economy recovers, which would substantially reduce the State funding required to deliver 
promised benefits to retirees. 
Figure 22 on shows the trend in the State's annual contributions to MainePERS since 
1993, the year in which Dollars and Sense was presented to the Maine Legislature and the 
public.  
  
To permit comparison of contributions that occurred at different times, dollars have been 
adjusted to 2008 values using the Consumer Price Index.  With only one noteworthy increase and 
a few dips, it can be observed that employer (i.e. State Government) contributions have remained 
relatively unchanged in real dollars since FY1993.  In 1993, the employer contribution expressed 
in 2008 dollars was approximately $346 million.  By FY2007, the annual contribution had 
declined to $336 million measured In inflation adjusted 2008 dollars, for a real decrease of -
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2.9%.  FY2008's $318 million contribution was even less and far less than the 1993 contribution 
when considered in real dollars and represents a real decline of over 8% during the period.  In 
contrast, the employee contribution increased by 37.7% between FY1993 and FY2007. 
As discussed in other sections, employer and employee contributions are both significant 
sources of funding for the Maine Public Employees Retirement System (MainePERS) and are 
important complements to investments.  Moreover, investment losses -- although often the 
largest -- are not the only claim on System assets.  Every year there are promised benefits that 
need to be paid to eligible retirees and employee contributions that need to be returned to 
employees who withdraw from the System before acquiring vested status.  These costs are taken 
out of System holdings and represent a growing annual deduction that must be taken into account 
when accumulated assets are calculated.  Table 13 displays these benefit and withdrawal 
payments from FY1993 to FY20008 and compares them to contributions.  Please note: The table 
does not show investment earnings, which have the largest impact on a retirement system's 
accumulated assets.   
The ratio of active employees making contributions to retirees receiving benefits is often 
used as a quick gauge of the sustainability of a retirement system because as the number of 
retirees grows so do the size of annual pension benefit payments.  Employee contributions can be 
a significant source of funding for retirement systems, but unless their size keeps pace with the 
number of retirees the per-dollar effect of each contribution will do less and less because these 
contributions are spread among more beneficiaries.  To use a purely hypothetical example, if 
three employees each contribute $100 to a fund that gives a $100 pension benefit to one retiree 
there will be $200 remaining for the fund to use for other purposes, such as investing in other 
assets.  If the fund supports two retirees the remainder drops to $100, and if it supports three 
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Table 13: MainePERS Contributions and Benefit & Withdrawals  
 in 000s of Real 2008 $ 
Fiscal 
Year 
Employee 
Contributions 
Government 
Contributions
Total 
Contributions Benefits  Withdrawals 
Total 
Benefits & 
Withdrawals
1993  $116,937  $345,879  $462,817  $326,308 $17,355  $343,664 
1994  $129,493  $276,291  $405,784  $341,277 $18,710  $359,987 
1995  $150,778  $344,861  $495,639  $385,710 $18,684  $404,394 
1996  $141,500  $348,062  $489,563  $391,812 $20,789  $412,601 
1997  $135,061  $337,457  $472,518  $381,159 $21,084  $402,242 
1998  $143,351  $362,961  $506,312  $406,795 $23,428  $430,223 
1999  $145,635  $387,305  $532,940  $421,287 $24,757  $446,044 
2000  $147,390  $322,906  $470,296  $429,251 $22,099  $451,350 
2001  $149,834  $331,401  $481,236  $448,375 $21,236  $469,611 
2002  $156,017  $507,270  $663,288  $474,407 $18,936  $493,343 
2003  $160,885  $346,940  $507,825  $490,018 $16,249  $506,267 
2004  $161,362  $344,430  $505,792  $506,749 $18,015  $524,764 
2005  $152,821  $321,483  $474,304  $518,379 $17,611  $535,990 
2006  $154,213  $343,781  $497,994  $537,219 $20,193  $557,413 
2007  $161,047  $335,861  $496,909  $562,289 $22,786  $585,075 
2008  $150,523  $317,758  $468,281  $576,346 $27,309  $603,655 
Source: US Census Bureau State & Local Public Retirement Systems Series 
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there is no remainder.  Only be maintaining the same ratio of employees to beneficiaries or by 
increasing the size of employee contributions can the per dollar effect of employee contributions 
be sustained when the number of beneficiaries rises. 
In the case of Maine, we have such a situation as described above.  As Figure 23 shows, 
the number of active employees making contributions to the Retirement System has remained 
relatively stable over the past sixteen years, with a low of approximately 47,500 in FY1996 and 
FY1997 and a high of around 52,400 in FY2005.  The number of beneficiaries receiving 
pensions through MainePERS, on the other hand, has steadily risen from approximately 24,400 
in FY1993 to 34,300 in FY2008.  This is a 40% increase and puts the FY2008 ratio of active 
employees to beneficiaries at 1.50, down sharply from 2.09 in FY1993.  This downward trend is 
important because long term financial stability of the Retirement System depends upon adequate 
injections of funding to support current and future retirees, and if the per dollar effect of one 
revenue stream decreases it puts more pressure upon the System's other funding sources. 
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  Some of this additional pressure has been alleviated in the Maine Public Employees 
Retirement System through growth in the size of the annual employee contribution which, 
because the size of Maine's public workforce has remained relatively unchanged over the past 
two decades, has taken the form of higher average annual contributions per employee.  
Legislative statute raised the percentage of salary state workers and public teachers pay into 
MainePERS from 6.5% to 7.65% effective FY1993, and from FY1993 to FY1995 the average 
annual per employee contribution grew from $2,288 to $3,155 in inflation adjusted 2008 dollars 
and has fluctuated around the $3,000 mark ever since.  This is an average increase of between 
$700 and $800 per employee and translates into an additional $30 million to $45 million 
annually in assets for the Retirement System.  On the aggregate level, the size of the employee 
contribution increased 37.7% between FY1993 and FY2007 (28.7% if the recession-affected 
FY2008 is used as the terminus instead). 
 
 
  It is likely that some of this upward movement in annual employee contributions is 
attributable to an aging workforce in both state government and Maine schools.  As public 
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employees advance in their careers and earn higher salaries, the percent of salary contributed to 
the Retirement System translates into more dollars.  If this is in fact part of the explanation, it is 
important to recognize that annual contributions by employees will shrink as current employees 
retire and are replaced by lower pay personnel and/or as positions are eliminated.  Consequently, 
the issue of forced and incentivized retirements should be considered within the context of the 
impact on System financing of the loss of employee contributions.  Permitting employees to 
work for a few additional years will not boost the retirement payment greatly and will also 
reduce the number of years for which retirement benefits must be paid. 
Benefit Payments and Withdrawals 
As Figure 25 demonstrates, when adjusted for inflation annual benefit payments and 
withdrawals from the Retirement System have steadily and consistently risen over the past two 
decades regardless of prevailing economic conditions.  More specifically, they have increased 
75.7% in real dollar terms, from approximately $344 million in FY1993 to $604 million in 
FY2008. 
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  An examination of Table 14 shows that this growth has been driven largely by increasing 
benefit payments, and this upward trend is expected to continue as Baby Boomers retire and 
current beneficiaries live longer due to increases in American longevity.  Moreover, although the 
trend seen in Figure 25 has heretofore been relatively linear and characterized by modest year-to-
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Figure 25: Annual Benefit Payments and Withdrawals ‐‐ Maine State 
Retirement System FY1992 ‐ FY2008, Inflation Adjusted 2008 Dollar Values
In
Thousands
Source: US Census Bureau State & Local Public Retirement Systems Series. 
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Table 14: MainePERS Statistics  Change 1993‐2007, Not 
Adjusted for Inflation 
Change 1993‐2007, Adjusted for 
Inflation (2008 $ Values) 
      $s  %  $s  % 
Total Receipts  $1,747,947  386.6%  $1,611,325  239.2% 
Total Contributions  $167,820  54.0%  $34,092  7.4% 
   Employee Contributions  $76,579  97.6%  $44,110  37.7% 
   Government Contributions  $91,241  39.3%  ‐$10,018  ‐2.9% 
Earnings on Investments  $1,580,127  1116.2% $1,577,233  747.8% 
Total  payments  $332,678  144.2%  $241,411  70.2% 
   Benefits  $322,387  147.2%  $235,980  72.3% 
   Withdrawals  $10,291  88.3%  $5,431  31.3% 
Accumulated Cash & Securities Holdings  $11,618,954  503.9%  $11,026,619  320.9% 
Statistics Recalculated with Recession‐
Affected FY2008 as Endpoint 
Change 1993‐2008, Not 
Adjusted for Inflation 
Change 1993‐2008, Adjusted for 
Inflation (2008 $ Values) 
$s  %  $s  % 
Total Receipts  ‐$286,876  ‐63.4%  ‐$508,435  ‐75.5% 
Total Contributions  $157,663  50.8%  $5,464  1.2% 
   Employee Contributions  $72,041  91.8%  $33,586  28.7% 
   Government Contributions  $85,622  36.9%  ‐$28,121  ‐8.1% 
Earnings on Investments  ‐$444,539  ‐314.0%  ‐$513,900  ‐243.6% 
Total  payments  $373,006  161.7%  $259,991  75.7% 
   Benefits  $357,345  163.2%  $250,038  76.6% 
   Withdrawals  $15,661  134.5%  $9,954  57.4% 
Accumulated Cash & Securities Holdings  $8,297,757  359.8%  $7,167,836  208.6% 
Source: US Census Bureau State & Local Public Retirement Systems 
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year increases, the large number of expected Baby Boomer retirements will escalate benefit 
payments and increase the rate at which this annual expense grows. 
Historically, total annual contributions from employees and State Government were 
greater than total annual benefit payments to retirees and employee withdrawals.  This reduced 
the need for positive yearly investment earnings to fund the System and allowed more resources 
to be allocated towards paying off the unfunded actuarial liability.  This changed in FY2004, 
however, when the annual expense of benefits and withdrawals overtook the annual income of 
employee and employer contributions, and this state of affairs has continued since then.  This is a 
potentially troubling trend because it increases the System's dependency on investment earnings 
to cover expenses, reduces the effect years with strong investment returns have on accumulated 
assets, and amplifies the System's sensitivity to economic downturns.  Barring increases in total 
annual contributions or an unlikely drop in benefit and withdrawal payments, this trend will 
continue into the near future. 
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Figure 26: MainePERS Employer & Employee Contributions Versus 
Benefits & Withdrawals in 000s of Real 2008 Dollar Values
Total Contributions
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  The Maine Public Employees Retirement System (MainePERS) is funded by employee 
contributions, employer (i.e. State Government) contributions, and investment gains on 
accumulated assets.  The first comprises the smallest share of revenue over the past two decades 
but is the most stable of the funding sources and grew over 25% in real 2008 dollars between 
FY1993 and FY2008.  The employer contribution consists of a fixed percentage of payroll and 
the annual required contribution (ARC) necessary to retire the System's unfunded liability from 
underfinanced pension benefits, but the annual amount is ultimately a matter of Gubernatorial 
recommendation and Legislative decision making.  Between FY1993 and FY2008 this revenue 
source shrank by -8.1%.  Investment gains account for over half of System revenues earned 
between FY1993 and FY2008 and totaled over $9 billion when adjusted for inflation in 2008 
dollars.  Annual investment returns are volatile and often mirror the U.S. economy.  Thus, they 
can be negative and decrease accumulated System assets during economic downturns, and a 
sound investment strategy is one that yields positive investment gains over time and is able to 
weather recessions when a long term view is taken. 
 MainePERS loses assets every year from pension benefits that need to be paid to eligible 
retired employees (i.e., beneficiaries), employee contributions that are returned to employees 
who withdraw from the System before becoming vested, and -- in years when MainePERS's 
investments perform poorly -- investment losses.  The recent recession has taken a significant 
toll on accumulated System assets but has not erased all of the progress made towards becoming 
a fully funded system since the early 1990s, and if historical patterns hold true these losses will 
be made up in future years by investment gains as the U.S. economy recovers.  More troubling is 
the 75.7% increase in annual benefit payments and withdrawals from FY1993 to FY2008, an 
increase driven mostly by benefit payments as the number of retirees grow and American 
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longevity increases.  This trend is expected to accelerate as the Baby Boomer generation retires 
due to their size and their high salaries, which means that their annual pensions may be larger 
(and thus more expensive) than their predecessors'.  Baby Boomer retirement could also 
negatively affect annual employee contributions which are based on a fixed percentage of salary.  
When these high earners retiree, if they are replaced in the workforce by employees with lower 
salaries or not replaced at all the annual employee contribution will shrink. 
 All in all, the Maine Public Employees Retirement System is not in immediate crisis and 
has accumulated assets large enough to continue paying pension benefits to retirees for years to 
come.  The System has experienced economic downturns and recessions before during the past 
two decades, and System assets still increased 209% from FY1992 to FY2008 in inflation 
adjusted 2008 dollars, rising from approximately $2.64 billion to $10.6 billion.  With that said, 
the number of beneficiaries and associated costs continue to increase and the System has reached 
a point where total payments for pension benefits and employee withdrawals now exceed total 
contributions from employees and State Government.  These are troubling developments, and 
unless action is taken to shore up the long term financial health of the Retirement System the 
State could find itself in a true crisis in the near future as the 2028 constitutional deadline for full 
funding approaches. 
These are serious issues for Maine, particularly in light of the large number of baby 
boomers nearing a retirement age, which in the near future will increase sharply the number of 
beneficiaries.  This shift will put sudden intense stress on funds by increasing the number of 
large payouts to new annuitants, while decreasing the fund’s ability to pay those disbursements 
by decreasing the number of large-share contributors.  As legislators in Maine determine the plan 
for the state, it is essential that they not only assess the current situation, but look forward to how 
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these ratios will affect the state’s ability to keep its side of the bargain with employees five, ten 
and twenty years from now.  The 5.5 percent state contribution determined to be “normal” by 
actuaries appears low for the state of Maine, given its ratio of employees to beneficiaries, and 
should be revisited in the face of the retirement system as the only source of post-retirement 
income for state workers and teachers.  
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